DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 420 578 SO 028 797

AUTHOR Lhowe, Mary, Ed.
TITLE Russia's Uncertain Transition: Challenges for U.S. Policy. Revised. Choices for the 21st Century.
INSTITUTION Brown Univ., Providence, RI. Thomas J. Watson, Jr. Inst. for International Studies.
SPONS AGENCY Pew Charitable Trusts, Philadelphia, PA.
PUB DATE 1996-08-00
NOTE 82p.
AVAILABLE FROM Choices Education Project, Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University, Box 1948, Providence, RI 02912 ($12).
PUB TYPE Guides - Classroom - Learner (051) -- Guides - Non-Classroom (055)
EDRS PRICE EDRS Price MF01 Plus Postage. PC Not Available from EDRS.
DESCRIPTORS Developing Nations; Diplomatic History; Foreign Countries; *Foreign Policy; Global Approach; Instructional Materials; *International Relations; National Security; Peace; Political Science; Secondary Education; Social Studies; *World Affairs
IDENTIFIERS *Russia

ABSTRACT

This unit is part of a continuing series on current foreign policy issues. The first section asks students to join the debate on U.S. policy toward Russia and its neighbors in the former Soviet Union (FSU). Background readings provide information to help students address policy issues and include: (1) "Two Centuries of U.S.-Russian Relations"; (2) "Keeping Up with a Changing Russia"; and (3) "Challenges Facing the United States." Once students have discussed background issues they are faced with the policy options to: (1) "Guide Russia Forward"; (2) "Keep the Lid On"; (3) "Declaw the Russian Bear"; and (4) "Mind Our Own Business." The second section accompanies a student book of background readings and foreign policy options. The five-day lesson plan and student activities has students explore policy relations with the former Soviet Union and debate what course of action the United States should pursue through a simulation activity. The lesson titles include: (1) "Examining the Principles of U.S. Cold War Policy"; (2) "Assessing the Reform Process in Russia'; (3) "Role Playing the Four Options: Organization and Preparation"; (4) "Role Playing the Four Options: Debate and Discussion"; and (5) "Fleshing Out Policy." (Contains supplementary documents and suggested readings at the end of section 1.) (EH)

**********
* Reproductions supplied by EDRS are the best that can be made *
* from the original document. *
**********

PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE AND DISSEMINATE THIS MATERIAL HAS BEEN GRANTED BY

S. Graseck

TO THE EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)

2A

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
Office of Educational Research and Improvement
EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)

This document has been reproduced as received from the person or organization originating it.

Minor changes have been made to improve reproduction quality.

Points of view or opinions stated in this document do not necessarily represent official OERI position or policy.

ED 420 578

# Russia's Uncertain Transition: Challenges For U.S. Policy

SO 028 797

ALTERNATIVES FOR PUBLIC DEBATE
AND POLICY DEVELOPMENT

A program of the Thomas J. Watson Jr.
Institute for International Studies

Brown University, Box 1948, Providence, RI 02912

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

*Russia's Uncertain Transition: Challenges for U.S. Policy* was developed by the Choices for the 21st Century Education Project staff with the assistance of the research staff of the Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies, scholars at Brown University, and several other experts in the field. We wish to thank the following researchers for their invaluable input:

Deana Arsenian, *Assistant Director*
*Center for Foreign Policy Development, Watson Institute*

Mark Garrison, *Former Director*
*Center for Foreign Policy Development, Watson Institute*

P. Terrence Hopmann, *Director*
*Center for Foreign Policy Development, Watson Institute*

Sergei N. Khrushchev, *Senior Visiting Scholar*
*Center for Foreign Policy Development, Watson Institute*

Leonid Kistersky, *E. L. Wiegand Distinguished Visiting Professor*
*Center for Foreign Policy Development, Watson Institute*

Mark Kramer, *Research Associate*
*Center for Foreign Policy Development, Watson Institute*

Heidi Kroll, *Economist*
*United States Agency for International Development*

James R. Millar, *Director*
*The Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies*
*George Washington University*

Stephen Shenfield, *Research Associate*
*Center for Foreign Policy Development, Watson Institute*

Richard Smoke, *Research Director*
*Center for Foreign Policy Development, Watson Institute*

Michael Spagat, *Assistant Professor of Economics*
*Brown University*

To Mary Lhowe, editorial associate at the Watson Institute, we extend additional thanks for editing this unit. Special thanks also to the high school teachers who tested drafts of this material in their classrooms prior to publication: Don Bakker of North Eastham, Massachusetts; Steve Buenning of Palatine, Illinois; and Candace Fisk of Springfield, Missouri.

*Russia's Uncertain Transition: Challenges for U.S. Policy* is part of a continuing series on current foreign policy issues. A new unit is published every three months during the academic year. Finally, we wish to thank The Pew Charitable Trusts, for without their financial support the series would not have come to fruition.

**CHOICES**

***for the 21st Century Education Project***

***August 1996***

**Director**
Susan Graseck

**Curriculum Developer**
Mark Malkasian

**Director of School Programs**
Patricia Keenan-Byrne

**Coordinator of Library Program**
Megan Secatore

**Program Associate**
Lucy Mueller

**Staff Associate**
Anne Campau Prout

The Choices for the 21st Century Education Project develops curricula for high schools and colleges on current foreign policy issues and offers workshops, institutes, and in-service programs for high school teachers. Course materials place special emphasis on the importance of educating students in their participatory role as citizens.

The Choices for the 21st Century Education Project is a program of the **Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies** at Brown University.

Thomas J. Biersteker
*Director*

# Contents


| | |
|---|---|
| **Part I: Two Centuries of U.S.-Russian Relations** | 1 |
| **Part II: Keeping Up with a Changing Russia** | 11 |
| **Part III: Challenges Facing the United States** | 18 |
| **Options in Brief** | 22 |
| **Options** | 23-30 |
| **Option 1: Guide Russia Forward** | 23 |
| **Option 2: Keep the Lid On** | 25 |
| **Option 3: Declaw the Russian Bear** | 27 |
| **Option 4: Mind Our Own Business** | 29 |
| **Focusing Your Thoughts** | 31 |
| **Supplementary Documents** | 32 |
| **Suggested Reading** | 45 |

The Choices for the 21st Century Education Project is a program of the Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies at Brown University. Choices was established to help citizens think constructively about foreign policy issues, to improve participatory citizenship skills, and to encourage public judgment on policy priorities.

The Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies was established at Brown University in 1986 to serve as a forum for students, faculty, visiting scholars, and policy practitioners, who are committed to studying global problems and developing international initiatives to benefit society.


© Copyright August 1994. Revised August 1996. Choices for the 21st Century Education Project. All rights reserved. Permission is granted to duplicate and distribute for classroom use with appropriate credit given. Copies may be ordered at $12.00 each. Address orders to: Choices Education Project, Watson Institute for International Studies, Box 1948, Brown University, Providence, RI 02912.

RUSSIA
North Sea
Arctic Ocean
Laptev Sea
Bering Sea
Norway
Denmark
Sweden
Barents Sea
Kara Sea
Germany
Baltic Sea
Finland
Poland
Lithuania
Latvia
Estonia
St. Petersburg
Archangelsk
Ural Mountains
Magadan
Siberia
Yakutsk
Sea of Okhotsk
Belarus
Smolensk
Ivanovo
Moscow
Nizhniy Novgorod
Moldova
Kursk
Perm
Ukraine
Voronezh
Yekaterinburg
Samara
Rostov
Magnitogorsk
Tomsk
Krasnoyarsk
Lake Baikal
Black Sea
Volgograd
Omsk
Novosibirsk
Chita
Georgia
Irkutsk
Turkey
Caspian Sea
Kazakstan
Vladivostock
Japan
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Aral Sea
North Korea
Iraq
Mongolia
South Korea
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
Kyrgyzstan
5
Iran
Tajikistan
China
6
Afghanistan

# Part I: Two Centuries of U.S.-Russian Relations

On Christmas Day, 1991, President George Bush addressed the nation as the once powerful Soviet Union tottered on the brink of collapse. Bush asserted that the disintegration of the communist superpower represented a victory for democracy, freedom, and American values. The future, according to the president, held out the promise of greater peace and prosperity worldwide, and he expressed confidence that the United States could help promote reform in the former Soviet Union.

The optimism that marked Bush's speech has since been dampened by the course of international events. A new era has begun, yet many of the dangers of the past remain. Just as Russia and the other countries of the former Soviet Union have entered a period of uncertainty, Americans have been forced to reassess our country's overall role in the world.

For four decades, the United States and the Soviet Union were locked in the Cold War. The two superpowers built up arsenals of nuclear weapons capable of destroying civilization many times over and extended their influence to every corner of the globe. The U.S.-Soviet rivalry was the driving force behind our country's vast network of alliances and formidable military. Two generations of American policymakers saw the containment of Soviet communism as their principal mission.

With the end of the Cold War, the United States lost its foreign policy compass. The Soviet collapse led many Americans to turn their attention away from issues overseas and to concentrate on our needs here at home. For American policymakers, other countries and problems surfaced on the U.S. foreign policy agenda.

Nonetheless, the former Soviet Union still casts an enormous shadow on the world stage. Russia — by far the largest of the fifteen former Soviet states — ranks as a giant among nations. The country covers one-seventh of the earth's land and contains huge reserves of oil, gas, minerals, and other natural resources. Even with its economy in shambles, Russia possesses a nuclear arsenal comparable to that of the United States and an army second in strength only to our own. No other country has the power to directly threaten the security of the United States.

Washington and Moscow are no longer bitter enemies, but neither are they allies. In the wake of the Soviet Union's disintegration at the end of 1991, both U.S. and Russian officials were quick to embrace one another as partners. Substantial progress was achieved in reducing nuclear arms and curbing international conflict. The initial enthusiasm, however, has been dimmed by the experiences of the post-Soviet era. The hope that Russia would swiftly adopt the American brand of democracy and free-market economics has been replaced by an understanding that Russia's future is far from certain. New voices have arisen in Russian politics to remind us that the former Cold War enemies remain divided on many important issues.

### *Your assignment*

In this unit, you will join in the debate on U.S. policy toward Russia and its neighbors in the former Soviet Union (FSU). You will grapple with the same questions that face U.S. policymakers: Should we view Russia as a potential ally, a tough rival, a wounded enemy, or something else? How do changes in the FSU affect the United States? What actions, if any, should we take to influence developments in Russia and the other former Soviet states?

The background reading has been designed to help you consider these questions. Part I surveys the history of U.S.-Russian relations from the 19th century to the collapse of the Soviet Union. Part II examines the transformation that Russia has undergone since 1992. Part III reviews the issues at the top of the U.S. agenda with respect to Russia and its neighbors.

## Shared Interests Link U.S. and Russia

In 1835, Alexis de Tocqueville, a French aristocrat and world traveller, predicted that the United States and Russia would eventually dominate the world. At the time of de Tocqueville's observation, international power was concentrated in Western Europe, particularly in Britain and France. De Tocqueville, however,

saw virtually boundless potential in the United States and Russia.

> *America's conquests are made with plowshares, Russia's with the sword;...nevertheless, each seems called by some secret desire of Providence one day to hold in its hands the destinies of half the world.*
>
> *—Alexis de Tocqueville*

In terms of geography, the United States and Russia shared much in common. Both were enormous countries with vast frontiers and great natural wealth. But whereas the United States was guarded from overseas aggression by two great oceans and benefited from accessible ports on both coasts, Russia was militarily vulnerable and economically isolated.

The broad plain that sweeps across Europe into the Russian heartland has left Russia open through history to overland invasion from the west. In addition, Russia's lack of ice-free ports has stifled trade and limited Russian naval strength. As de Tocqueville noted, geography placed both the United States and Russia on the path to world power and accounted for many of the differences in the two societies.

In contrast to the democratic, federal system of the United States, Russia in the 19th century was a highly centralized authoritarian state. The Russian tsars (a word that comes from the Roman title of "caesar") ruled their empire with almost unrestrained power. Government resources supported a huge military. Cannons, warships, and other items related to defense were produced with state funds.

Despite their political differences, U.S. and Russian leaders shared a common concern during much of the 19th century — the British empire. While the United States feared British meddling in North America, Russia was locked in a struggle with Britain for influence in the Middle East and Central Asia. During the Crimean War of 1853-56, the United States favored Russia in its conflict with Britain, France, and Ottoman Turkey. Forty American doctors even went to Russia as volunteers to treat wounded Russian soldiers.

Mistrust of Britain also helped pave the way for the U.S.-Russian agreement on the sale of Alaska. In the early 19th century, Russia, Britain, the United States, and Spain each staked out territorial claims on the Pacific Coast of North America. Russian explorers reached the New World by way of Alaska, undertaking their first expeditions in the 1740s. By the 1800s, the Russian presence extended as far south as California. Like the Spanish colonies in the southwest, Russian trading posts were sparsely settled and poorly defended. Russian officials were particularly concerned that the British, who at the time controlled Canada, would seek to expand into Alaska. The Russians saw the United States as a counterweight to Britain and were eager to open negotiations with Washington on Alaska. The two sides quickly agreed in 1867 that the United States would buy the huge territory for $7 million.

> *We do not know in the entire world two states which could offer each other so many qualities promising friendship and alliance as Russia and the United States of America.*
>
> *—Birzhevye viedomosti (Stock reports), 1868*

U.S.-Russian relations took a turn for the worse when the United States entered the competition for empire at the turn of the century. With its victory in the Spanish-American War of 1898, the United States acquired colonies in the Caribbean and the Pacific. In addition, U.S. trade interests in Asia and U.S. naval power were on the rise. As a result, U.S. and Russian ambitions increasingly came into conflict. In China, for example, the United States' desire for open trading relations collided with Russia's efforts to control the northeastern Chinese province of Manchuria.

## War and Revolution

World War I forever changed U.S.-Russian relations and the balance of power in Europe. The United States reluctantly entered the war in April 1917 on the side of Russia, Britain, and France. President Woodrow Wilson and a great majority of Americans had vigorously opposed U.S. involvement when fighting broke out in Europe in August 1914. However, German submarine attacks against American shipping and a

growing fear that Germany would emerge as the dominant power in Europe convinced Wilson to join the Allies.

By the time the United States declared war, Russia was in chaos. On the battlefront, the Russian army had suffered nearly 4 million deaths and lost huge tracts of land to Germany. Politically, Tsar Nicholas II had been forced from power in March 1917. A democratic government had been established and vowed to continue the war, but increasing misery and instability undermined both the war effort and the new government. In November 1917, V.I. Lenin led a communist revolution in Russia. Lenin proclaimed a workers' state and pulled Russia out of the war.

Like Britain, France, and other nations of the West, the United States was suspicious of Lenin and the communists. In the short term, Lenin's decision to sign a separate peace treaty with Germany increased the military pressure on the remaining Allies. More unsettling for the long term was Lenin's plan to spread the communist revolution worldwide. The Allies sent small contingents of troops to Russia to aid forces inside the country opposing the communists. By 1921, however, the communists had established control over much of the old Russian empire. The following year, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), or Soviet Union, was officially formed.

The Soviets watched from the sidelines as the United States, Britain, and France molded the international system after the surrender of Germany and the other Central Powers in November 1918. At the Paris peace conference, the Allies redrew Russia's frontier without inviting Soviet participation. The Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, as well as Finland, were created from the old Russian empire's lands. Most of Poland was formed from the territory of the empire, while Romania received the province of Bessarabia.

The Soviets were likewise barred from joining the League of Nations, a global organization that was designed to settle international disputes and thwart aggression. (The U.S. Senate voted against American membership in the League in 1920, although the organization was largely a creation of President Wilson.) The strategy of the Allies was meant to isolate the Soviet Union internationally and block the spread of communism.

### *Origins of the Soviet system*

Communism, in fact, made little headway after World War I. Except for the existence of a communist government in Hungary for a few months in 1919, communism failed to take root outside the borders of the old Russian empire. Lenin's successor, Josef Stalin, turned the attention of the Soviet Union away from pursuing worldwide revolution and toward industrializing the backward Soviet economy. Stalin believed that the Soviet Union had to industrialize at all costs in order to defend communism against the capitalist countries of the West.

To achieve his goals, Stalin fashioned a "command economy." Under Stalin's rule, the state controlled all aspects of economic activity and directed the distribution of goods for the whole country. Government planners made every decision, from how much wheat would be grown to how many shoes would be manufactured. Soviet communism represented a rejection of the capitalist system of the United States, Britain, and other Western countries, where most economic decisions were made by individual producers and consumers.

The Soviet economic experiment won considerable admiration in the United States and Europe, especially after an economic depression struck the West in 1929. Some observers were attracted to the concept of government control over the economy. Others supported the emphasis on equality that was central to communist ideology. In the early 1930s, when one-quarter of the labor force in the United States was unemployed, Stalin could claim that the state provided everyone with a job in the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, the closed nature of Soviet society smothered news about Stalin's reign of terror and network of prison camps that would take more than 10 million lives.

> *A single death is a tragedy; a million deaths is a statistic.*
>
> *—Josef Stalin*

### *Alliance against Hitler*

In the 1930s, the rise of Nazi Germany under Adolf Hitler forced the leaders of the United States, Britain, and France to reconsider the balance of power in Europe. Containing German aggression became the chief foreign policy goal of the Western democracies. As a result, Western perceptions of the Soviet Union quickly shifted. Democratic leaders now saw the Soviets as a potential counterweight to Germany. In 1933, the United States established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. The following year, the Soviets were admitted to the League of Nations.

Hitler and Stalin agreed that war between German Nazism and Soviet communism was inevitable. During the 1930s, both leaders pressed forward with plans for a rapid military buildup. Between 1933 and 1938, German defense spending increased ninefold, while the Soviets raised their military expenditures by fifteen times. By 1938, Nazi Germany's defense budget was the largest in the world — five times higher than U.S. levels.

*He can't break this handclasp!*

Harper in the *Birmingham News-Herald*, April 1945

In August 1939, Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union stunned the West by signing a non-aggression treaty. The next month, Germany invaded Poland from the west, followed a few weeks later by the Soviets from the east. The so-called "Pact of Steel," however, proved temporary. In June 1941, Hitler directed his armed forces against the Soviet Union. The invasion was the first step in Hitler's grand strategy of repopulating the vast plains of the Soviet Union with German colonists.

The struggle between the Nazis and the Soviets was titanic. The Soviet Union lost 20 to 30 million people and saw its land devastated by the German onslaught. At Stalingrad alone — the battle that turned the tide of the war in the winter of 1942-43 — the death toll suffered by the Soviet army was more than three times the number of American deaths for the entire war.

World War II also resulted in an alliance between the Soviet Union and the United States. During the course of the war, the United States provided the Soviet Union with roughly $11 billion worth of military supplies, as well as crucial intelligence on German military operations. The shipment of 200 American fighter aircraft, for example, allowed the Soviets to mount a key counter-offensive against the Nazis in December 1941.

## Cold War Sets In

When soldiers from the United States and the Soviet Union shook hands on the banks of the Elbe River in central Germany on April 25, 1945, they were also greeting the beginnings of a new international order. World War II had crippled the old European power system. Nazi Germany was defeated and destroyed. Britain had bankrupted its economy in achieving victory. France and Italy faced poverty and social upheaval.

Among the leading powers, only the United States and the Soviet Union emerged from the war with a strengthened position in the international arena. The United States stood unrivaled as the mightiest nation on earth. Spared from attack, the U.S. economy had soared out of the depression to produce much of the equipment needed for the Allied war effort. Moreover, the United States in 1945 possessed the world's most advanced military and the only atomic weapons.

The Soviet Union was a formidable force in its own right. Despite their enormous war losses, the Soviets had built up an army of 12 million soldiers to defeat Nazi Germany. By the time Josef Stalin met President Franklin D. Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill at the Black Sea resort of Yalta in February 1945, the Soviets were poised to play a decisive role in post-war Europe.

Stalin could rightfully claim that his country had shouldered the greatest burdens in defeating the Germans. "Uncle Joe," as Stalin was known to many Americans during the war, had also convinced Roosevelt that the Soviets were reliable allies. At Yalta, Stalin pledged to help the United States defeat Japan once the war with Germany was over. In exchange, the Soviets were allowed a freer hand in shaping the future of Eastern Europe.

### "Iron Curtain" falls in Eastern Europe

The alliance of World War II quickly dissolved once the fighting ended. By February 1946, Stalin predicted that the conflict between communism and capitalism would lead to a new war. Meanwhile, his troops remained firmly in place throughout much of Eastern Europe. Churchill had warned his U.S. allies of the Soviet threat even while World War II was raging. In 1946, after losing the prime minister's post, he became more convinced that Stalin was seeking to divide Europe in two. In March, Churchill presented his concerns to an American audience in Fulton, Missouri, that included a sympathetic President Harry Truman.

Soviet influence in Eastern Europe, however, represented a distant concern for most Americans at the close of World War II. President Roosevelt had acknowledged at the Yalta conference that public opinion would not permit U.S. troops to remain in Europe for more than two years after the war. Roosevelt based his assessment on the traditional American distaste for involvement in European affairs.

> *From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the Continent. Behind that line lie all the capitals of the ancient states of Central and Eastern Europe. Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest, and Sofia, all these famous cities and the populations around them lie in what I must call the Soviet sphere.*
>
> *—Winston Churchill*

### Containing Soviet expansion

A shift in American attitudes began within a small circle of U.S. policymakers led by George F. Kennan. A diplomat at the U.S. embassy in Moscow during World War II, Kennan sent an 8,000-word cable to the State Department in February 1946 that dismissed the possibility of cooperating with the Soviet Union. Kennan believed that the Soviet system was based on paranoid hostility toward the outside world and proposed that the United States seek to contain the expansion of Soviet communism. In the long run, Kennan felt, communist ideology would lose its aggressive edge and begin to soften. Kennan's memorandum was circulated widely among U.S. policymakers. In 1947, it served as the basis for an article entitled "The Sources of Soviet Conduct" that appeared in the prestigious journal *Foreign Affairs*.

Kennan's concept of "containment" gradually came to shape the policies of those in the Truman administration who wanted to stand up to the Soviets in Europe. In March 1947, President Truman announced his intent to "support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressure."

Known as the Truman Doctrine, the policy statement was linked to a request to Congress for military aid to Greece and Turkey. Although few Americans were deeply interested in the Greek civil war or Soviet territorial claims in Turkey, communist aggression was increasingly viewed as a serious menace.

### The Marshall Plan and NATO

The Truman Doctrine rested on two expensive U.S. commitments. In April 1948, Congress approved the European Recovery Program after lengthy debate. Better known as the Marshall Plan, the program was an economic aid package that invested $12.5 billion (about $73 billion in 1994 dollars) into the reconstruction of sixteen European states from 1948 to 1952. Although they were invited to participate, the Soviets refused U.S. assistance, and barred their Eastern European satellites from accepting aid.

Militarily, the United States joined with ten countries of Western Europe and Canada in 1949 to form the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). By 1955, NATO had expanded to include thirteen European members, including West Germany. With the signing of the NATO treaty, the United States committed itself to the defense of Western Europe and pledged for the first time in history to maintain a substantial U.S. troop presence overseas.

## Superpowers Extend Influence

The United States in 1950 was in many respects at its zenith in global power. The U.S. share of the world's income was 52 percent. Americans held 49 percent of international financial reserves. The United States produced approximately half of the world's oil and steel. And yet, many Americans were deeply worried by the international political climate. In less than a decade, the United States had been thrust into the role of global policeman. Voices from an earlier era, such as Senator Robert Taft, warned that too much emphasis on foreign affairs and military strength would warp American democratic values. Secretary of Commerce Henry Wallace feared that Truman's policies would "divide Europe into two warring camps" and hoped to promote international cooperation through the United Nations. The opinions of Taft, Wallace, and others had been aired at thousands of town-hall meetings throughout the country while the Marshall Plan was debated in Congress. By 1950, however, most Americans were prepared, perhaps reluctantly, to shoulder greater international responsibilities.

> *It is one thing to agree to go to war with Russia if it attacks Western Europe. It is another to send American ground troops to defend Norway or Denmark or Holland or Italy or even France and England.*
>
> —Sen. Robert Taft

The consensus that emerged around U.S. Cold War policies was shaped in large part by international events. In June 1948, the Soviets imposed a blockade on the western part of Berlin to unify the German capital under communism. (Western Berlin had been placed under U.S., British, and French control after the division of the city following the war.) With overland traffic cut off by the surrounding Soviet forces, the United States and its allies airlifted 8,000 tons of supplies daily to western Berlin. The Berlin blockade lasted almost a year until the Soviets backed down.

More ominous developments followed. In September 1949, the Soviets exploded their first atomic bomb. The next month, communists led by Mao Zedong won control of mainland China and joined Moscow in pressing for the spread of communism worldwide. In June 1950, communist North Korean forces invaded South Korea, drawing the United States into a three-year conflict that ended in a stalemate.

### Balance of terror

By the mid-1950s, U.S. leaders had given up on the idea that the frontier of communism in Eastern Europe could be rolled back by force. President Dwight D. Eisenhower rejected appeals that the United States respond militarily when the Soviets sent tanks into Hungary in 1956 to crush the independent-minded government there. Rather, U.S. leaders reluctantly accepted the Soviet sphere of influence in Hungary and elsewhere behind the "Iron Curtain." At the same time, Eisenhower and his successors believed that the United States had no choice but to maintain its role as a military superpower.

Moscow's development of nuclear weapons forced American defense planners to devise a new approach to national security. U.S. conventional, or non-nuclear, forces were built up. Without a nuclear monopoly, Truman and Eisenhower bolstered the U.S.

province in Western Europe to deter Soviet aggression. By 1955, the number of American troops in the region had reached 810,000, and over half of the U.S. military budget was earmarked for defending Europe. Meanwhile, American policymakers hoped to maintain their head start in the arms race. In 1947, Truman ordered that 400 nuclear weapons be ready by 1953. Under Eisenhower, the doctrine of "massive retaliation" committed the United States to use nuclear weapons to counter a Soviet attack on Western Europe.

The arms race came close to erupting into nuclear war in October 1962, when the Soviets attempted to secretly install nuclear missiles on the island of Cuba. After discovering Moscow's preparations, President John F. Kennedy demanded that the missiles be withdrawn. Kennedy imposed a naval blockade on Cuba and warned that the United States would take stronger military action to remove the Soviet installations. Nearly two weeks of tension followed before the Soviets backed down.

## U.S.-Soviet Detente

As Western Europe recovered from World War II, the primary arena of U.S.-Soviet confrontation shifted to Asia, Africa, and Latin America — the so-called Third World. Vietnam was one of the main flashpoints. The war the United States waged against communism in Southeast Asia had been inherited from France. The French had been the colonial rulers of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos for nearly a century before leaving the region in defeat in 1954. U.S. policymakers viewed the effort to protect the anti-communist government in South Vietnam as part of the global battle against communist expansion.

> *[The United States will] pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, to ensure the survival and the success of liberty.*
>
> —John Kennedy

By the end of the 1960s, U.S. involvement in Vietnam had compelled many Americans to reconsider their country's role in the world. From George Kennan's original focus on Europe, the U.S. policy of containing Soviet communism had widened into a global enterprise. As opposition to the Vietnam War deepened after 1968, U.S. policymakers increasingly sought to define the limits of American interests.

At the same time, long-standing assumptions of the Cold War were being challenged by larger shifts in international relations. In the 1950s and 1960s, Western Europe and Japan had moved quickly to close the economic gap with the United States. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union had nearly caught up to the United States in military power.

### *Nixon's Initiative*

President Richard M. Nixon led the reassessment of U.S. foreign policy. In Congress and as Eisenhower's vice president, Nixon had built his political career around staunch anti-communism. In 1972, however, he visited China and the Soviet Union. The trip to Moscow was highlighted by the signing of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT), a major

agreement between the two superpowers on controlling nuclear weapons. This opened an era of "detente." Nixon hoped detente (French for the relaxation of tensions) would produce a new set of rules for superpower conduct and prevent international crises such as the Berlin blockade. The Soviets, for their part, saw the improvement in relations as an acknowledgment of their status as an equal of the United States.

> *Both the United States and the Soviet Union share an overriding desire to achieve a more stable peace in the world.*
>
> —*Richard Nixon*

Much of the impetus behind detente came from the tremendous buildup of Soviet nuclear forces during the 1960s. After being pressured to withdraw their nuclear missiles from Cuba in 1962 by U.S. military superiority, Soviet leaders vowed to erase the nuclear advantage that the United States had long enjoyed. For the remainder of the decade, the Soviets invested heavily in their nuclear program.

Meanwhile, the Soviets made it clear that they would use force to maintain the communist system in the Soviet bloc. The most notable challenge to Moscow — a budding reform movement within the Czechoslovak leadership — was smashed in 1968 by Soviet troops.

By the mid-1970s, detente had recast superpower relations. The new order was affirmed by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), a gathering in Helsinki, Finland, that brought together the United States, the Soviet Union, Canada, and thirty-two European countries. The agreement that was produced by the CSCE in 1975 recognized the division of Europe into two camps and guaranteed human rights. In addition, the two Cold War alliances permitted representatives from the opposing side to observe their military maneuvers, thus reducing the likelihood of a surprise attack.

Soviet leaders hailed the accord as legitimizing their domination over East Germany. At the same time, the citizen groups that formed in the Soviet bloc to monitor the human rights provisions of the agreement became a thorn in their side.

### *Detente crumbles*

As the 1970s came to a close, detente became less meaningful. In 1976, the Soviets raised anxiety among NATO leaders by aiming a new generation of highly accurate nuclear missiles at Western Europe. Meanwhile, Moscow resented the emphasis on human rights in the foreign policy of President Jimmy Carter. Detente collapsed altogether in December 1979, when the Soviet army invaded neighboring Afghanistan to prop up a pro-Soviet government. The Carter administration responded by imposing an embargo on trade with the Soviet Union and boycotting the 1980 summer Olympic games in Moscow. An arms control treaty, known as SALT II, stalled in the U.S. Senate. U.S.-Soviet relations deteriorated further with the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980. Spurning detente, Reagan came to office attacking the USSR as the "evil empire" and calling for an increase in U.S. defense spending.

In the Soviet Union, the reassertion of U.S. military power prompted the Soviet leadership to reconsider the USSR's role in the world. In the mid-1980s, Moscow found itself bogged down in a costly war against Muslim guerrillas in Afghanistan, while at home the Soviet economy stagnated. Politically, the country was facing uncertainty too. When Leonid Brezhnev died in 1982, he was replaced by two aged members of his inner circle. After the deaths of these two men, power in the Soviet Union passed to the representative of a younger generation, Mikhail Gorbachev.

## Gorbachev's New Thinking

By the time Mikhail Gorbachev was selected to head the Soviet Communist Party in 1985, his country was struggling to keep up with its Cold War rival. Internationally, the Soviet system had lost much of its appeal in the Third World. Not only was the Afghanistan war perceived as a setback, but Soviet allies in Cuba, Ethiopia, Vietnam, and elsewhere were foundering economically. At home, the Soviet economy itself was beset by corruption and inefficiency. More significantly for Moscow's global ambitions, Soviet science and technology were falling further behind the West.

Gorbachev represented a marked contrast to the

leadership of Leonid Brezhnev. In his mid-fifties, energetic, and open to new ideas, Gorbachev stood apart from the generation of communist officials stamped by memories of Stalin and World War II. He recognized that the Soviet Union would need to undergo serious change to maintain its superpower status. Initially, Gorbachev tried to spur greater productivity and discipline among Soviet workers. He launched a campaign against alcohol abuse by reducing the availability of vodka and other spirits. In dealing with Moscow's Eastern European satellites, Gorbachev pressed for greater diplomatic unity and more favorable terms of trade for the Soviet Union. The new Soviet leader's early efforts, however, failed to halt the Soviet Union's decline. In 1987, Gorbachev unveiled a more sweeping set of reforms to reinvigorate the Soviet Union. *Perestroika* (restructuring) and *glasnost* (openness) opened up Soviet society to the outside world like never before.

> *We must not pretend that everything goes smoothly....If we are silent about some shortcomings, they will inevitably grow.*
>
> —*Mikhail Gorbachev*

Gorbachev hoped that greater contact with the West would bring new technology and investment into the Soviet Union. A key element of his strategy stressed improving Moscow's international image. Gorbachev proved especially bold in proposing arms control initiatives with the United States. Ironically, his partner on the U.S. side of the Cold War thaw was Ronald Reagan, a stalwart opponent of detente during his first term in office.

Gorbachev's policies were equivalent to an earthquake in international relations. Many of the basic principles that had guided U.S. policymakers were suddenly called into question by Moscow's new outlook. The tremors also shook Eastern Europe. Although Gorbachev had no intention of giving up the Soviet Union's Eastern European empire, he was not willing to use military force to maintain control over Moscow's satellites. The first challenges to communist authority occurred in Poland and Hungary in 1988, where democratic movements forced government officials to open up the political process. In 1989, popular pressure brought down old-line communist regimes not just in Poland and Hungary, but also in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania. The historical drama continued into 1990, when West and East Germany were reunified after forty-five years of division.

## Disintegration of the Soviet Union

The revolutions in Eastern Europe and the reunification of Germany were hailed throughout the world as a victory for democracy. In the Soviet Union, however, public opinion was mixed. Many Soviets, particularly those with memories of World War II, felt that control over Eastern Europe and the presence of 370,000 Soviet troops in East Germany provided a buffer against outside attack and affirmed the Soviet Union's status as a superpower.

In contrast, non-Russian peoples within the Soviet Union were emboldened by events in Eastern Europe. Since 1988, national groups in the Soviet Union's non-Russian republics had been campaigning for greater control over their own affairs. In 1990, Lithuania was the first of the Soviet Union's fifteen republics to openly declare independence from Moscow. Although Gorbachev cut off supplies of heating oil to Lithuania and sent in troops to occupy Communist Party property, other republics continued to seek more autonomy from the central government.

Meanwhile, the Soviet Union's economic reforms had stalled. Under Gorbachev's program of *perestroika*, Moscow's grip on the Soviet economy was relaxed. Factory managers and farm directors were given greater decision-making power. The Soviet Union also had become more open to foreign investment. But *perestroika* was a halfway measure. Gorbachev feared that lifting price controls and taking other measures to create a free-market economy would turn people against the Soviet system and undermine the authority of the Communist Party.

By 1990, the Soviet economy was in a tailspin. The country's economic output fell 8 percent that year. The next year it dropped 19 percent. Instead of sparking initiative, *perestroika* contributed to a breakdown of

the chain of command that tied local enterprises to the central government, without really giving managers freedom to act.

Faced with mounting problems and conflicting demands, Gorbachev struggled to hold onto power. Politically, he walked a tightrope between reformers and hard-liners. In 1991, the Soviet leader increasingly surrounded himself with conservative officials. At the same time, Gorbachev opened negotiations with leaders from the Soviet Union's fifteen republics on establishing a new relationship with the central government. In August 1991, the tightrope snapped under Gorbachev's feet. Hard-line communists launched a coup to reassert the power of the central government. The coup organizers, though, had little active support outside the top ranks of the Communist Party. Within three days, their plot collapsed.

Following the coup, the pace of change in the Soviet Union accelerated. Russian Republic President Boris Yeltsin, who had stood up to the forces of the coup from atop an armored personnel carrier in front of the Russian parliament building, moved decisively to transfer power from the central government to the Russian Republic. The three Baltic republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were quickly recognized as independent states. Other republics soon followed.

The final death blow to the Soviet Union came in December 1991, when leaders of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus announced the formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Unable to hold the USSR together, Gorbachev resigned as Soviet president. On the final day of 1991, the Soviet Union officially ceased to exist.

## The Republics of the Former Soviet Union

| Republic | Population (1995) | Area in square miles | Per capita GDP (1994) | Exports (1994) | Imports (1994) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Russia | 149,900,000 | 6,591,027 | $4,820 | $48 bil. | $35.7 bil. |
| Ukraine | 51,900,000 | 233,028 | $3,650 | $11.8 bil. | $14.2 bil. |
| Uzbekistan | 23,100,000 | 172,696 | $2,400 | $944 mil.* | $1.15 bil.* |
| Kazakstan | 17,400,000 | 1,048,878 | $3,200 | $3.1 bil. | $3.5 bil. |
| Belarus | 10,400,000 | 80,134 | $5,130 | $968 mil.* | $534 mil.* |
| Azerbaijan | 7,800,000 | 33,428 | $1,790 | $366 mil.* | $296 mil.* |
| Tajikistan | 6,200,000 | 55,237 | $1,415 | $320 mil.* | $318 mil.* |
| Georgia | 5,700,000 | 26,904 | $1,060 | unknown | unknown |
| Kyrgyzstan | 4,800,000 | 76,621 | $1,790 | $116 mil* | $92 mil.* |
| Moldova | 4,500,000 | 13,008 | $2,670 | $245 mil. | $296 mil. |
| Turkmenistan | 4,100,000 | 188,407 | $3,280 | $382 mil.* | $304 mil.* |
| Lithuania | 3,900,000 | 25,167 | $3,500 | $2.2 bil. | $2.7 bil. |
| Armenia | 3,600,000 | 11,503 | $2,290 | $43 mil.* | $120 mil.* |
| Latvia | 2,800,000 | 24,743 | $4,480 | $1 bil. | $1.2 bil. |
| Estonia | 1,600,000 | 17,409 | $6,460 | $1.65 bil. | $1 bil. |

*Figures are for trade outside of the former Soviet Union.

# Part II: Keeping Up with a Changing Russia

For more than seven decades, the Russian people worked for the advancement of Soviet power under the red flag of communism. With the collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991, the communist banner was put aside and the traditional white, blue, and red Russian tricolor was revived. Many Russians hoped that the change in flags would be accompanied by a sharp break with the Soviet past.

In 1996, however, the red flag resurfaced in Russia's public life. President Boris Yeltsin decreed that the red banner should fly alongside the Russian tricolor at patriotic ceremonies. The gold hammer and sickle — the symbol of communism — in the upper, left-hand corner of the flag had been replaced by a single star, but the message to the Russian people was nonetheless clear. Post-Soviet Russia was not yet ready to turn its back on the Soviet era.

### *Russia's uncertain course*

In this part of the background reading, you will learn more about the stops and starts of Russia's transition since 1992. Russia's direction is particularly important for Americans. As you will learn in Part III of the background reading, our country's foreign policy in the 21st century will be shaped in large part by developments in Russia.

Five years of rocky change have left the Russian people confused about their country's future. Economic reform has hurt more people than it has helped. Political divisions have repeatedly brought Russia to the brink of civil war. A rebellion in the southern border region of Chechnya has claimed more than 30,000 lives. Finally, Russia's fall from its position as international superpower has produced a widespread sense of humiliation and resentment.

The past five years, however, also contain signs of promise. Russia has held presidential and parliamentary elections that were judged to be relatively fair. Russian leaders claim that key sectors of the economy are recovering. They also note that the earlier doomsday forecasts of famine and anarchy have proven wrong. Rather, they emphasize that Russia has cleared the chief hurdles to stability and prosperity.

Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, change in the new Russian state has advanced on three fronts. Politically, the Communist Party's monopoly on power has given way to the beginnings of a multiparty democracy. Economically, Russia has moved away from the centrally planned economy. In the international arena, a new foreign policy has been crafted to address the loss of Russia's empire and superpower status.

## Democracy Russian Style

The new Russian state began its life without a stable political system. Unlike the United States and other mature democracies, Russia lacks a tradition in which two or three well-established political parties compromise and share power. Rather, political competition in the new Russia has often revolved around clashes among well-known public figures. Rivalries have been bitter, even violent, with politicians often taking a winner-take-all approach to issues.

### *Election results*

Russia's political system passed an important test in the summer of 1996. In Russia's first presidential elections since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Yeltsin was re-elected to a four-year term.

The elections fell short of Western standards of democracy. Yeltsin, for example, leaned heavily on the Russian media to promote his candidacy. Contributions from big companies connected to the government allowed Yeltsin to greatly outspend his rivals. Nonetheless, election observers agreed that there was little fraud in counting the ballots. Over two-thirds of the Russian electorate turned out to vote, and the results were accepted without violence.

The outcome of the presidential elections provides an insight into the concerns of Russian voters. Yeltsin and Gennady Zyuganov, the candidate of the Communist Party, led the field in the first round of balloting in June 1996. Yeltsin received 35 percent of the vote while Zyuganov won 32 percent. Third place went to a political newcomer, Alexander Lebed, a

tough-talking former general who polled 15 percent of the vote. The most prominent democratic reformer, Grigory Yavlinsky, finished a disappointing fourth with 7 percent. Near the bottom was former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev. He captured just 0.51 percent of the vote.

With the runoff election pitting Yeltsin against Zyuganov, the Russian president moved quickly to build bridges to his rivals. He named Lebed his national security adviser and won the endorsement of several other presidential candidates. When the decisive runoff was held in July 1996, Yeltsin easily topped Zyuganov, 54 to 40 percent.

Even Yeltsin's critics conceded that the president had staged a remarkable comeback. In December 1995, elections to Russia's parliament seemed to represent a sound rejection of Yeltsin's policies. Zyuganov's communists had been the big winners, gaining one-third of the seats in Russia's Duma, or lower house of parliament. The extreme nationalist Liberal Democratic Party finished with the second-highest vote totals, while the party closest to Yeltsin — Our Home is Russia — captured only 10 percent of the ballots.

Favorable media coverage and energetic campaigning accounted for much of Yeltsin's political recovery. Perhaps more important, however, was the president's willingness to spend government money to raise the spirits of the Russian electorate. In the months before the presidential elections, Yeltsin took steps to increase pensions to the elderly, give tax breaks to industry, and pay back wages to workers who had often gone for months without their salaries.

### A political spectrum takes shape

A range of political positions has gradually emerged from the tumultuous first years of the new Russia's independence. At one end are the democratic reformers who pushed Russia toward the free-market system in 1992. They hope that Russia's political and economic system will come to resemble that of the West. The reformers have been widely blamed for their country's economic problems. Nonetheless, they believe that time is on their side. They expect their appeal to increase as a new generation learns to value the principles of economic opportunity and individual freedom. Anatoly Chubais, Yeltsin's chief of staff, is the leading reformist voice in the Yeltsin administration.

The free-market reformers have met fierce opposition from communists and nationalists. They believe that the break-up of the Soviet Union has brought Russia humiliation and disgrace. The communists and nationalists contend that the reformers have sold out Russia to the West. They are especially angered by the decline in the country's industrial might, arguing that reform has made the economy dependent on exports of raw materials.

> *Russia is a special world...a special type of civilization...hostile in its soul to the West.*
>
> *—Gennady Zyuganov*

The platform of the nationalists and the communists concentrates on restoring Russia's power and prestige. They would sharply increase military spending and grant the central government greater authority to manage the country's resources. In March 1996, they won overwhelming approval in the Duma for a resolution to restore the old Soviet Union.

The middle ground in Russian politics had been occupied by pragmatic moderates. Their chief objective is to promote economic reform in Russia over the long term, while maintaining order and stability. Above all, they want to prevent the chaos that Russia has experienced in past periods of political change. In foreign policy, the pragmatists have shown their readiness to defend Russian interests abroad, but have also been careful to avoid a confrontation with the West. The pragmatists have rallied around Our Home is Russia and the party's main spokesman, Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin.

### War in Chechnya

The war in the break-away region of Chechnya has recast Russia's political landscape and left sharp divisions within the Yeltsin administration. Since the outbreak of fighting in December 1994, Chechen guerrilla fighters have repeatedly outmaneuvered Russia's 1.9 million-man army. In August 1996, Chechen forces drove Russian troops out of Grozny, Chechnya's capital, after a one-year lull in the conflict.

Jack Ohman. Reprinted by permission. Tribune Media Services.

Shortly after joining the Yeltsin administration, Alexander Lebed reached a peace agreement with the Chechen leadership. He accused Russian army leaders of incompetence and corruption, and demanded the resignation of the interior minister. In turn, Russian military commanders in Chechnya openly defied Lebed's order that they observe a cease-fire in Grozny. In Moscow, top Russian officials, including Boris Yeltsin, voiced criticism of Lebed's efforts. Ordinary Russians were left to wonder who was in charge of their country.

> *A pauper country [Russia] with a weak economy cannot afford the luxury of fighting a war.*
> —*Alexander Lebed*

Under the agreement negotiated by Lebed, Russian troops began withdrawing from Grozny in August 1996. A decision on Chechnya's political status is not scheduled to be finalized until the year 2001. Until then, Moscow has pledged to cooperate with Chechen forces to maintain order and rebuild the economy of the region. Even under the best of circumstances, peace in Chechnya faces many threats.

The Chechen conflict has deep roots in Russian history. A Muslim people in the rugged northern Caucasus along Russia's southern fringe, the Chechens have fiercely resisted Russian rule for centuries. In 1944, Stalin deported more than 500,000 Chechens to Siberia on false charges that they had collaborated with Nazi Germany during World War II. The Chechens were not allowed to return to their homeland until 1957.

The Chechen war has changed political attitudes in Russia. Relations between the country's more than 20 million Muslims and ethnic Russians have grown tenser. Bombings and other acts of terrorism have been linked to Chechen rebels. As a result, Russian political observers believe that most Russian voters are more concerned about crime, stability, and national security, and less tolerant of minority groups.

At the same time, the war has drawn new attention to the division of power between Moscow and Russia's regions. Under Yeltsin, Moscow has shown a greater willingness to transfer authority to local leaders than at any time in Russian history. As a result, roughly half of government spending in Russia now takes place at the local level.

## Economic Changes

At the eye of Russia's political storm has been the country's economic crisis. Since 1990, when the old Soviet economy began turning sharply downward, Russians have been forced to cope with soaring inflation, a deep decline in production, and rising unemployment. The great majority have seen their living standards plunge. At the same time, the Russian economy has become a battleground in the struggle among the country's political leadership.

### *Shock therapy*

In the months following the failed coup of August 1991, the initiative belonged to a group of bold economic reformers who formed the inner circle of Yeltsin's government. With the help of advisers from the United States and other Western countries, they

drafted a program known as "shock therapy" to lay the groundwork for a free-market economy in Russia.

The most important changes began in January 1992. Price controls were lifted on 90 percent of the goods sold in Russia. Government spending was slashed and plans were drawn up to place state-run companies in the hands of private owners. The "Boys in Reeboks," as the team of economic advisers was called, realized that many of the inefficient, state-run factories that had been kept alive during the Soviet era would have to close or drastically trim their work forces. They predicted, however, that free-market competition would give rise to new companies and generate new jobs.

Yeltsin's popularity at first overwhelmed many of shock therapy's opponents. By the summer of 1992, the factory managers, farm directors, and other defenders of the old Soviet economic system were ready to fight back.

The political tug-of-war produced a confusing economic picture. Critics of shock therapy succeeded in maintaining the flow of government subsidies to big industries. Consequently, unemployment rose only slightly.

Government presses, however, were working overtime to print money so that state-run factories and farms could pay their workers. At the same time, government officials imposed heavy taxes to hold down the budget deficit.

By September 1993, the confrontation over economic policy had led Yeltsin to dissolve parliament. Street violence between anti-Yeltsin forces and troops loyal to the president erupted in Moscow in early October. The clash left the top floors of the Russian parliament in flames and killed at least 140 people. Although Yeltsin defeated his political foes, his country's economic performance for 1993 left most Russians fearful. Prices had increased nine times and production had dropped by 12 percent.

### *Reining in reform*

The results of the December 1993 election marked another turning point in Russia's economic policies. Critics of economic reform, led by the Liberal Democrats, outpolled parties supporting the free-market system. In response, Yeltsin backtracked on his commitment to shock therapy. In January 1994, many of Yeltsin's free-market advisers were removed or demoted. Their ranks were mostly filled with allies of Russia's industrial managers. Viktor Chernomyrdin, formerly the director of the Soviet gas industry, headed the new government.

> *The period of market romanticism has ended for us. We must make our people's life easier.*
>
> *—Viktor Chernomyrdin*

Chernomyrdin has not reversed the course of economic reform, but neither has he pressed forward at full speed. Instead, Russia's economy has settled into a niche somewhere between Soviet communism and Western-style capitalism.

Chernomyrdin has continued the privatization efforts introduced in 1992. All but a few vital sectors of the economy, such as defense, nuclear energy, communications, and transportation, have been placed under private ownership. Many of the most profitable enterprises have fallen into the hands of

Mike Keefe in *The Denver Post*. Used with permission.

factory directors, former high-level bureaucrats, and others with close ties to the government.

### *Winners and losers*

The Russian economy that has emerged from years of restructuring stands in stark contrast to its Soviet predecessor. Russian industrial production has declined roughly by half since 1992. Virtually gone are the industries — such as household electronics and textiles — that once produced consumer goods for the closed Soviet market. In most cases, Russian factories have been unable to compete with the flood of foreign imports.

Meanwhile, soaring prices have shattered the economic security that sheltered Russians during the Soviet era. In 1992, prices for consumer goods increased twenty-five times. Inflation has gradually dropped since then, yet remains very high by Western standards. In 1995, for example, Russia's inflation rate was 131 percent.

Russia's economy is increasingly based on raw materials. By 1996, about half of Russia's exports consisted of energy, minerals, and timber. Exports of Russian machinery and equipment represented 5 percent of Russia's sales abroad.

The big winners in Russia's economic transformation are those that have gained a stake in the oil and gas industries. Privatization gave government and industry officials from the Soviet era an inside track on acquiring control of many of Russia's most profitable companies. The greatest prize has been Gazprom, a company which holds a monopoly over Russia's natural gas industry and controls roughly one-third of the world's proven gas reserves.

Over the long term, however, economists predict that Russia's energy industry will need foreign investment to improve efficiency. In the 1980s, Soviet oil output ranked first in the world. Since 1987, oil production has fallen 40 percent, lower than that of Saudi Arabia and the United States. Most potential foreign investors have been scared off by corruption and the uncertainty of Russia's legal system and tax code.

At the same time, Russia's economic reform has produced many legitimate success stories. Banking, insurance, stock brokerage, and other financial services have gained a foothold in the Russian economy. Entrepreneurs capable of adjusting to the tastes of well-off Russian consumers are also among the winners.

In addition, Russia's high-tech industries in space research, nuclear technology, weapons, and metals are competitive in the world market. In 1995, Russia exported $6 billion in arms to poor, developing nations, ranking ahead of the United States for the first time since the Cold War. There are even bright spots within Russia's heavy industrial sector. The directors of Uralmash, for example, have cut their work force nearly in half and have formed a joint venture with two American companies. Uralmash products now include a new model of oil rig that better meets the needs of Russia's privatized oil companies.

In human terms, the losers in Russia's transformation so far outnumber the winners. According to the World Bank, one-third of Russia's population lives in poverty. Elderly pensioners and farm workers have been especially hard hit. Life expectancy for Russian males has steadily fallen since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The average Russian boy born in 1996 is expected to live only fifty-seven years (as compared to seventy-two years in the United States). Health experts blame in part high rates of smoking and alcoholism, but they also report a growing failure to vaccinate children against preventable diseases and an increase in birth defects that may be linked to the environmental abuses of the Soviet era.

## Foreign Policy

Historically, Russian leaders have focused their energies on strengthening their country's position in the world. From Peter the Great to Mikhail Gorbachev, government policy has centered on international relations, particularly on matters relating to the military. President Yeltsin's government, however, must cope with a world in which Moscow has lost much of its international clout.

Even as Yeltsin has wrestled with daunting problems at home, the foreign policy of the new Russia has gradually edged closer to its past roots. Many of the interests and concerns that preoccupied Russian policymakers decades and even centuries ago have

again moved to the top of Moscow's agenda. In the process, Russian leaders have tilted away from the West and toward a worldview that stresses Russia's uniqueness.

### *Empire in shambles*

In the wake of the Soviet collapse, Yeltsin's foreign policy initially sought to build new bridges to the West. The emphasis on close relations with the West led Russia to overlook its ties with the other states of the former Soviet Union. Russia's foreign minister did not make his first tour of the other FSU countries until April 1992.

While Russia neglected its former Soviet neighbors, the full impact of the Soviet Union's disintegration began to be felt. Under the Soviet system, the republics had been linked economically not only to Moscow, but to each other. Without a framework to sort out economic relations, many of the ties that had held together the Soviet economy unraveled. Russian factory directors were suddenly cut off from vital supplies of parts and raw materials. As a result, trade in Russia and the other FSU states plummeted, contributing in large part to the region's economic crisis.

With respect to defense, Russia lost possession of radar stations, air bases, and other key military installations located elsewhere in the FSU. These facilities had been deliberately built on the periphery of the Soviet Union to protect the heartland of the country from attack.

Meanwhile, Russia's borders with its former Soviet neighbors were poorly defended and geographically vulnerable. Russian officials feared that without control over the old Soviet borders their country would be easy prey for drug traffickers, terrorists, and others seeking to exploit Russia's weakness.

By the end of 1992, Russian foreign policymakers had shifted their focus to the other states of the former Soviet Union. A new term — "near abroad" — emerged to describe Russia's perspective on the other former Soviet republics.

### *Defining the "near abroad"*

Ukraine and Kazakstan have become the new Russia's top foreign policy priorities. Other than Russia itself, Ukraine and Kazakstan are the largest former Soviet states. Both countries are rich in raw materials and contain substantial Russian communities within their borders.

Russia has sought to bring Ukraine and Kazakstan securely under its wing, especially in the area of foreign and economic policy. In contrast, Ukrainian and Kazak leaders have tried to break free of Russian domination and assert their independence. Ukraine has turned westward in hope of establishing new ties with the countries of Western Europe and the United States.

Likewise, Kazak leaders have reached out to the West in an attempt to distance themselves economically from Russia. They have eagerly embraced Western partners, such as American oil companies, to develop their vast energy resources. They have also taken steps to block Russian investment in their newly privatized firms.

Elsewhere in the near abroad, Russia has sought to define a clear sphere of influence for itself. Moscow has stationed thousands of Russian troops as peacekeepers in Tajikistan and Georgia. Russian officials fear that turmoil in former Soviet states to the south will expose their own country to a flood of refugees and fuel the spread of radical Islamic fundamentalism among Muslims in Russia. At the same time, Russia has been accused of manipulating ethnic conflicts to advance its foreign policy aims.

Moscow has been particularly forceful in asserting a Russian stake in the resources of the energy-rich Caspian Sea Basin. The region's oil reserves are estimated to be surpassed only by those of the Persian Gulf and Siberia. Russia and Iran have held that the Caspian Sea's resources should be developed jointly by the five countries that border the inland sea. Kazakstan, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan — with the support of Western energy companies — have staked out their own claims to what are believed to be the most promising drilling sites in the Caspian Sea.

The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) has emerged as an important tool of Russian policy. Russia took the lead in forming the organization in December 1991 to promote military and economic cooperation among the former Soviet republics. By 1994,

all except Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania had joined the CIS, often due to Russian pressure. Dependence on Russian energy supplies and pipelines has reinforced Moscow's interests.

Under the CIS umbrella, Russia has forged an economic union that aims to remove trade barriers and coordinate economic policies among the former Soviet states. The CIS countries are increasingly becoming key trading partners for Russia. In 1995, about one-quarter of Russia's trade was with other members of the commonwealth. In addition, Russia has played a leading role in policing the borders of the CIS.

### Russia on the world stage

Russia's diplomatic offensive within the CIS has been accompanied by a more assertive posture in the international arena. Russian officials acknowledge that their country no longer commands the superpower status of the Soviet Union, but they have continued to insist on recognition as a great power.

In the United Nations, Russia has pressed for a special peacekeeping role in the former Soviet Union. Russia has also campaigned to become the eighth member of the Group of Seven (G-7) wealthy democracies, and has already gained a political voice in the exclusive organization.

In the months following the Soviet collapse, policymakers on both sides of the old Cold War divide spoke optimistically of constructing a partnership between the former enemies. Russia cooperated with the West in imposing sanctions on Iraq, a former Soviet ally, after the Persian Gulf War and struck the most sweeping arms control agreement ever with the United States.

Since 1993, however, hopes for friendly relations between Russia and the West have dimmed. President Yeltsin has vigorously opposed proposals to bring old Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe — especially Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic — into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

> *Those who insist on the expansion of NATO are making a major political mistake. The flame of war would burst out across the whole of Europe.*
>
> *—Boris Yeltsin*

In the former Yugoslavia, where Serbs, Croats, and Bosnian Muslims have fought since the early 1990s, Russia and the West have usually found themselves on opposite sides of the conflict. Russia has historically been a protector of the Serbs, who share the Orthodox Christian faith of Russia. Nonetheless, Russia joined a U.S.-led United Nations peacekeeping mission in 1995 that stopped the fighting in Bosnia.

# Part III: Challenges Facing the United States

For more than forty years, anxiety about the Soviet Union consumed the United States. In movies, books, and television programs, the Soviets were typically depicted as a global menace. From Central America to southern Africa to the Middle East to Southeast Asia, Washington was locked in a deadly chess match with Moscow. Looming over the confrontation was the possibility that the Cold War might ignite a catastrophic nuclear exchange.

American attitudes have changed dramatically since the Cold War years. Interest in the old Soviet Union has slipped well down the national agenda. Russia is no longer seen as a grave threat to our country. Trade between the former Soviet countries and the United States is comparatively small, while instability and conflict in the region have left many Americans confused and indifferent. Finally, pressing domestic issues, such as welfare reform and health care, have nudged foreign affairs out of the national spotlight.

At the same time, the end of the Cold War left behind many unresolved problems, and also created some new ones. Issues involving nuclear weapons and Russian ambitions abroad continue to command international attention.

In this part of the background reading, you will examine the leading issues in U.S.-Russian relations. As you will see, today's agenda is closely linked to the Cold War era and Russia's experience since the collapse of the Soviet Union.

## Nuclear Threats

Russia's nuclear arsenal is the only force on earth, other than our own nuclear arsenal, capable of virtually destroying humanity. When the Soviet Union fell apart, Russia and its neighbors inherited about 35,000 nuclear warheads and the world's largest stockpile of nuclear bomb materials.

Nuclear arms fall into two categories. Tactical nuclear weapons consist of short-range missiles, artillery shells, and other armaments intended for battlefield use. Strategic nuclear weapons are long-range missiles and nuclear-equipped bombers capable of reaching the United States.

Tactical nuclear weapons had been scattered throughout the Soviet Union, but by early 1992 the authorities in Moscow had concentrated all of them in Russia. The strategic nuclear missiles presented a different problem, since most of them could not be easily moved. Eighty-five percent of the missiles were based in Russia, but that still left sizeable forces in Ukraine, Kazakstan, and Belarus.

Following the Soviet collapse, significant progress was achieved in reversing the nuclear arms race. Ukraine, Kazakstan, and Belarus agreed to turn their nuclear arsenals over to Russia. In addition, U.S. and Russian leaders in 1993 signed a breakthrough treaty, START II, that called for unprecedented cuts in nuclear weapons stockpiles.

From 1994 to 2003, the United States and Russia are scheduled to reduce their arsenals of strategic nuclear weapons by over two-thirds. Both sides will retain 3,500 strategic nuclear warheads — each capable of destroying a large city. However, the most dangerous class of nuclear weapons — long-range missiles carrying several nuclear warheads — will be eliminated altogether. Moreover, the United States and Russia in 1994 erased the codes that were needed to launch their long-range nuclear missiles at each other's territory. For the first time since they were developed in the late 1950s, Russian long-range nuclear missiles are no longer aimed at American cities, and vice versa.

### *New dangers*

While arms control has moved forward, U.S. policymakers have recognized that the disintegration of the Soviet Union has spawned a new set of issues related to nuclear weapons. Many of the most pressing concerns stem from Russia's weakness.

Moscow has struggled to maintain security over its nuclear weapons program. Russian officials acknowledge that nuclear materials in their country are dispersed throughout a vast web of military installations, weapons laboratories and assembly factories, research institutes, nuclear power plants, naval fuel depots, nuclear waste storage facilities, and other sites.

According to Western estimates, Russia possesses 170 tons of plutonium and 1,000 tons of highly enriched uranium. Less than ten pounds of weapons-grade plutonium is needed to make a small nuclear bomb. An even smaller amount would be sufficient to poison the water supply of a large city and kill thousands of people.

> *It's possible to buy anything in our country, including [nuclear] weapons and samples.*
> —*Igor Matveyenko, Russian physicist*

Nuclear weapons experts fear that Moscow is unable to plug the leaks in its nuclear program. They believe that nuclear research centers and power plants are especially vulnerable to would-be smugglers of nuclear materials. Within Russia, criminal gangs are in the best position to gain access to nuclear materials and sell them on the international black market. A few pounds of plutonium can be worth tens of millions of dollars.

So far, only a handful of nuclear smuggling cases have surfaced. In 1994, for example, German authorities seized about two-thirds of a pound of plutonium smuggled from Russia — the largest quantity netted in a smuggling operation since the Soviet collapse.

### U.S. response

Since 1992, the United States has budgeted roughly $400 million a year to be spent on dismantling nuclear weapons and tightening security at nuclear facilities in the FSU. In 1992, the United States also agreed to pay Russia $12 billion for 500 tons of weapons-grade uranium diluted for use as fuel in American nuclear energy plants.

U.S. security efforts have branched out to address a wide range of concerns raised by the downsizing of the Soviet military. U.S. aid has gone toward building apartments to house retired military officers and converting defense factories to the production of consumer products.

American programs have been most successful in preventing the emigration of the roughly 2,000 scientists in the FSU who have the technical knowledge to make nuclear arms. The United States has funded special projects designed to keep the scientists from being lured by tempting job offers abroad.

### Russian resistance

The U.S. response to nuclear threats, however, has been limited by Russian foreign policy. As the might of other parts of the old Soviet military machine has slipped, Russia's nuclear arsenal has assumed greater importance. Many Russian officials view nuclear weapons as a guarantee of their country's status as a great power and have shielded the nuclear program from the most severe budget cuts.

Moscow has rejected U.S. aid for dismantling its nuclear weapons and has blocked U.S. specialists from visiting its nuclear facilities. Likewise, the deal involving the sale of Russian uranium to the United States has been stalled.

Meanwhile, Russia has continued work on a huge underground military complex in the Ural Mountains that was begun in the 1970s. The complex includes its own railroad and highway, and is eventually expected to employ thousands of workers.

Finally, nuclear power plants in the FSU figure

Chip Bok in the *Akron Beacon Journal*. Reprinted by permission: Creators Syndicate

into the nuclear threat. Nuclear energy experts, including many Russians, have questioned the safety of the twenty-nine nuclear reactors in Russia. Nonetheless, government officials there argue that their country cannot afford to switch to other energy sources. Officials in other former Soviet states with nuclear reactors — Armenia, Kazakstan, Lithuania, and Ukraine — share similar attitudes.

In Ukraine, where a nuclear accident at Chernobyl in 1986 forced 130,000 people to evacuate their homes in an area slightly larger than Maryland, nuclear power is seen as an alternative to nearly complete dependence on Russian oil and gas. At the urging of the United States, Ukrainian officials have pledged to eventually close the Chernobyl plant, but the facility is likely to continue operating into the next century.

## Russia's Role in the World

Since Russia began taking on a larger international role in 1993, U.S. policymakers have been split over our country's response. Some view Russia as a force for stability in the troubled region along its southern border and have argued that the United States should respect Russia's place as a great power in the international system. Others believe that the United States must take a firm stand against Russian ambitions abroad and help Russia's neighbors in the FSU stand up to Moscow.

The future of NATO ranks at the top of the U.S.-Russian agenda. NATO was created by the United States and its Western European allies to block Soviet aggression in Europe. Without the Cold War, the military alliance's mission is no longer clear. Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and other countries from Central Europe and the FSU have campaigned for full NATO membership.

Russian leaders have warned that bringing NATO forces closer to Russia's borders would revive military tension between Russia and the West. They are particularly wary of continued U.S. involvement in Europe, and have suggested that NATO's role on the continent be sharply reduced.

In 1996, the administration of President Bill Clinton called on NATO to begin accepting new member states in 1997. At the same time, U.S. officials tried to ease Russian concerns by offering Moscow an important voice in shaping security issues in Europe.

Whatever its ties to NATO, Russia's military casts a long shadow across Europe. Despite deep budget cuts, Russia's 1.9 million-man army remains by far the largest force in Europe. Russia's military setbacks in Chechnya have wounded the army's morale, raising worries that Russian generals may seek to strike elsewhere to prove their strength.

### Competition in the near abroad

Russia's near abroad is the arena in which the United States and Russia have most often butted heads. The position of Ukraine has been considered particularly pivotal.

Russian policymakers assert that their former Soviet neighbor should be closely aligned with Russia. Meanwhile, the United States has supported Ukrainian efforts to break free of Moscow's orbit. In 1996, Ukraine was the top recipient of U.S. aid in the FSU and the fourth-largest recipient worldwide.

The United States and Russia are also locked in competition for the energy resources of the Caspian Sea Basin. U.S. oil companies have reached deals for exploiting the oil and natural gas fields of Kazakstan and Azerbaijan. Moscow, however, has used its control of energy pipelines to gain a share of the expected profits for Russian oil companies. The competition between Russia and the West, as well as the instability of the Caspian region, has stymied development. The American oil giant Chevron, for example, has invested $1 billion in Kazakstan with few concrete results.

## Trade and Aid

Trade policy and economic aid have been the main tools by which the United States has tried to influence Russia's direction. In 1992, the goals of U.S. policy were well-matched with the Yeltsin government's ambitious program of free-market economic reform. Proposals for large-scale economic aid programs were put forward in the West. There was even talk of sponsoring the equivalent of the Marshall

Plan for Russia and its neighbors.

By 1993, the big-spending foreign aid proposals had faded. Russian reformers were left frustrated and disappointed by the lack of Western assistance. Many had staked their policies on the expectation that foreign aid would help cushion the blow of economic change. As their influence within the Yeltsin government declined, Russian foreign policy began turning away from the West.

The Clinton administration soon gave up on hopes of developing a close alliance with Russia. Instead, U.S. officials have emphasized the need to keep long-term Russian reform on track. They are particularly worried that the rise of the communists and nationalists in Russian politics could revive the tensions of the Cold War. The Clinton administration has focused on cooperating with Russia to address common concerns, such as stopping the spread of nuclear weapons and combating terrorism. They have continued to back Yeltsin and have supported extensive foreign aid to the FSU.

From 1991 to 1995, the United States channeled $8.7 billion in foreign aid to the FSU, of which about $3 billion was earmarked for Russia. More significant has been U.S. pressure on international financial institutions to aid Russia.

Since the Soviet collapse, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has loaned Russia $21 billion. Nearly half of that sum (the second-largest loan in IMF history) was provided a few months before the 1996 presidential election and injected new life into the Yeltsin campaign. President Clinton vigorously pushed the IMF loan forward. In addition, he urged Western governments and banks to ease the repayment terms on most of Russia's $100 billion foreign debt.

> *Russia must not isolate itself. Its integration [into the West]...will depend on the choices its leaders and its people make.*
>
> *—Secretary of State Warren Christopher*

Critics of the Yeltsin government, both inside and outside of Russia, have questioned the wisdom of Western assistance to Russia. They charge that loans and aid have contributed to corruption, fueled the war in Chechnya, and allowed officials to delay enacting painful, but necessary, economic measures.

Meanwhile, Russian leaders insist that open trade is much more critical to their country than aid. To that end, Viktor Chernomyrdin has cooperated with Vice President Al Gore to lower trade barriers between Russia and America. In turn, the Russians have accepted U.S. and IMF recommendations to eliminate taxes on energy exports and to establish straightforward laws for foreign investment.

Even with the end of the Cold War, trade between the United States and Russia has been meager. In 1994, America exported $2.5 billion worth of goods to Russia and imported $1.7 billion — a tiny fraction of the more than $1 trillion in U.S. trade for the year.

Overall, Russia has enjoyed a trade surplus since 1993. In 1995, Russian exports topped imports by $23 billion. In a few areas, such as defense and space technology, Russian companies offer serious competition to their Western counterparts.

Clashing foreign policy interests have spilled over into trade relations. Russia has rejected U.S. appeals to cancel a deal to build four nuclear reactors in Iran and has sought to rebuild trade connections with Iraq. Russian officials condemned U.S. air strikes against the Iraqi military in the summer of 1996.

## Conclusion

In the coming days, you will have an opportunity to consider a range of alternatives for U.S. policy toward Russia and its neighbors. Each of the four viewpoints, or options, that you will explore in the next part of this unit is based on a distinct set of values and beliefs. Each takes a different perspective on your country's role in the world and Russia's direction in the next decade. You should think of the options as a tool designed to help you better understand the contrasting strategies from which Americans must craft future policy. At the end of this unit, you will be asked to make your own choices about where U.S. policy should be heading.

## Options in Brief

### Option 1 — Guide Russia Forward

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian people have struggled to transform their society. There have been setbacks and disappointments, but there have also been substantial breakthroughs. Russia remains in a period of transition. At this critical juncture, Americans must not waver in our commitment to reform in Russia. We must reach out to bring Moscow into the international community. Along with our key allies in Western Europe and Japan, we should do what we can to keep Russia on track toward democracy and the free market. To enlist Russia's cooperation in solving common problems, we must make room for Moscow in the decision-making process.

### Option 2 — Keep the Lid On

The collapse of the Soviet Union has unleashed a new set of problems for the United States and its allies. The mess in Russia and its neighbors is not of our making. Nonetheless, we cannot ignore it. The United States must work to ensure that the problems afflicting the region do not become our problems. Above all, we should not be rocking the boat by pushing half-baked reform schemes or meddling in the relations among the FSU countries. In coping with the instability in Russia, we should keep in mind our country's primary foreign policy interests. To meet our priorities, the United States should promote stability and order. The best we can do is to keep the lid on this vast, simmering country.

### Option 3 — Declaw the Russian Bear

Although the Soviet Union no longer exists, much of the power of our Cold War enemy remains in the hands of Russia. Since 1992, the voices of authoritarianism and nationalism have grown stronger, both inside and outside of Boris Yeltsin's government. Russia is again showing its teeth, and turning away from the United States. Americans must recognize that the Cold War is not over. We must understand that our interests and the interests of Russia will inevitably conflict. Rather than helping Russia renew its economic and military competition with the United States, we should take steps to declaw the Russian bear.

### Option 4 — Mind Our Own Business

For forty years, the Cold War not only dominated U.S. foreign policy, but also took precedence over vital concerns here at home. Now that the Cold War is over, it's time to put our national priorities back in order. Rather than searching for new entanglements overseas, the United States should strive to limit its involvement in the FSU. Recent events have made clear the foolishness of promoting experimental reform programs or sticking our nose into disputes between Russia and its neighbors. Let us turn our attention to revitalizing the United States.

Option 1

# Guide Russia Forward

**For forty years, the United States spent trillions of dollars on our country's confrontation with the Soviet Union. Ultimately, America's resolve paid off. Today, our country's commitment is again being tested. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian people have struggled to transform their society. There have been setbacks and disappointments, but there have also been substantial breakthroughs. Democracy has begun to sink roots in Russian society, while economic reform has established a solid foundation. On the world stage, Russia and the United States are not allies, but neither are they enemies. In short, Russia remains in a period of transition. To a large extent, the nature of international relations in the next century hinges on Russia's direction.**

**At this critical juncture, Americans must not waver in our commitment to reform in Russia. We must reach out to bring Moscow into the international community. Along with our key allies in Western Europe and Japan, we should do what we can to keep Russia on track toward democracy and the free market. Americans and Russians may not agree on every issue, but we can nonetheless work together to promote global peace and prosperity. On many fronts — controlling the spread of nuclear weapons, protecting the environment, and combating terrorism and drug trafficking — Russian participation is essential. To enlist Russia's cooperation in solving common problems, we must make room for Moscow in the decision-making process. We must recognize that Russia has a positive role to play in international affairs. After spending trillions of dollars on the Cold War, we would be foolish not to extend a hand of friendship to the new Russia. We have a historic opportunity to remake the world. Let's not miss it.**

## What policies should we pursue?

- The United States should lower barriers to trade with Russia and encourage American investment.

- The United States should support IMF loans to promote Russian economic reform and give Russia extra time to pay back its foreign debt.

- The United States should gain Russian approval before expanding NATO into Central Europe.

- The United States should recommend that Russian peacekeeping operations in the FSU receive recognition from the United Nations.

- The United States should cooperate with Russia to control the spread of nuclear weapons and address Russian security concerns before developing new anti-missile defense systems.

- The United States should press for Russia's inclusion in important international organizations, such as the Group of Seven (G-7) and the World Trade Organization.

## Lessons from the Cold War

Thanks to the determination and far-sightedness of U.S. leaders, a Western alliance capable of standing up to the Soviet Union was forged in the late 1940s. After World War II, the United States helped lay the foundation for stable free-market democracy in Western Europe. Our country's aid and diplomatic involvement transformed friend and foe alike. In the case of West Germany, Marshall Plan assistance extinguished support for Nazism and united Germans with our traditional allies in Western Europe. Regrettably, the same approach was not applied after World War I. Without U.S. help, Germany experienced poverty and chaos in the 1920s. These desperate conditions gave rise to Adolf Hitler.

## PROS SUPPORTING ARGUMENTS

1. Helping Russia establish democracy and free-market prosperity will strengthen the cause of reform throughout the world, especially in the other countries of the FSU.

2. Prosperity in Russia will open a huge new market for U.S. trade and investment, thus spurring economic growth here at home.

&

3. Accepting Russia as a partner of the West will ensure that Russia is on our side in future international disputes.

## CONS OPPOSING ARGUMENTS

1. Continuing our support for Russia will serve to reward Russian officials who have enriched themselves through corruption and worked against U.S. interests in the international arena.

2. The revival of Russia's economy will inevitably be turned against us, as hard-line forces seek to restore their country's international influence at the expense of the United States.

3. Putting our chips on the current Russian government is not only a foolish bet, but could harm our relations with future leaders in Russia.

4. At a time when American workers face heightened pressure from global competition, the United States should hardly be channeling American investment or trade benefits to Russia.

Option 2

# KEEP THE LID ON

The collapse of the Soviet Union has unleashed a new set of problems for the United States and its allies. The huge nuclear program built during the Soviet era is in tatters, leaving huge stockpiles of weapons and other nuclear materials up for grabs. The next political crisis in Russia may put the nuclear button in the hands of anti-Western extremists. Meanwhile, war and poverty have created thousands of refugees in the FSU, and millions more could be on the move if conditions worsen. The mess in Russia and its neighbors is not of our making. Nonetheless, we cannot ignore it. The United States must work to ensure that the problems afflicting the region do not become our problems. Above all, we should not be rocking the boat by pushing half-baked reform schemes or meddling in the relations between Russia and its neighbors.

In coping with instability in Russia, we should keep in mind our country's primary foreign policy interests. Needless to say, we would like to see democracy, human rights, and free-market economic systems flourish. But U.S. policy cannot be guided by far-fetched dreams. We cannot reshape the world in our image. We cannot expect to make Russia our partner in international affairs. Normal, business-like relations are the best we can hope for. In the meantime, we should concentrate on responding to specific threats. Most important is making sure that Russia's military force and nuclear arsenal do not endanger world peace. Control over nuclear materials is essential. In addition, we must prevent ethnic conflicts and refugee crises from spilling over the borders of the FSU into Europe and the Middle East. To meet our priorities, the United States should promote stability and order. No one can predict the outcome of Russia's transition. For the moment, the best we can do is to keep the lid on this vast, simmering country.

### What policies should we pursue?

- The United States should offer trade benefits to Russia in exchange for Russian progress in dismantling its nuclear arsenal.
- The United States should support limited IMF loans to prevent an economic crisis in Russia.
- The United States should proceed cautiously, but steadily, with the expansion of NATO into Central Europe.
- The United States should maintain a balanced policy toward disputes between Russia and its neighbors.
- The United States should focus U.S. aid on strengthening the security of sites in Russia where nuclear materials are stored and press Moscow to allow U.S. specialists to inspect its nuclear facilities.
- The United States should reward responsible Russian behavior in the international arena by encouraging Russian participation in important international organizations, such as the Group of Seven (G-7) and the World Trade Organization.

### Lessons from the Cold War

U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War was most effective when it focused squarely on protecting U.S. interests. The creation of NATO, for example, clearly communicated our country's intention to defend Western Europe from Soviet aggression. For more than four decades, the alliance kept the peace in a region of vital U.S. interest. Our country's greatest mistakes during the Cold War resulted when we overstepped our national interests and failed to recognize our limits. U.S. involvement in Vietnam, for example, extended well beyond the scope of our country's original Cold War strategy.

## PROS SUPPORTING ARGUMENTS

1. Taking a balanced approach toward disputes within the FSU will promote stable, peaceful relations between Russia and its neighbors.

2. Speeding up the dismantling of Russia's nuclear weapons and the downsizing of its defense industry will allow other countries in Europe and Asia to cut military spending as well.

&

3. Shifting our efforts in Russia toward promoting stability, rather than pushing reform, will reduce anti-American feelings among the Russian people.

## CONS OPPOSING ARGUMENTS

1. Giving up on Russia's transition now will kill momentum toward democratic and free-market reform throughout the region.

2. Allowing Russia to drift aimlessly in the international arena will undermine efforts to promote global peace and cooperation.

3. Pressing the non-Russian states of the FSU to accept Russia's leadership on security issues will turn them against the United States and fan tensions between Russia and its neighbors.

4. Focusing U.S. concern on the FSU will distract us from dealing with social problems here at home and restoring the health of the American economy.

Option 3

# DECLAW THE RUSSIAN BEAR

Although the Soviet Union no longer exists, much of the power of our Cold War enemy remains in the hands of Russia. With three-quarters of the Soviet Union's territory, Russia is the biggest country in the world. Its vast reserves of raw materials are matched by no other nation. Furthermore, Russia continues to maintain a huge army and a nuclear arsenal only slightly less advanced than our own. Russia's present leaders are determined to restore their country's stature in world affairs. Following the Soviet collapse, many foreign policy specialists naively believed that Russia would join us in embracing democracy and free-market economics. Their initial optimism, however, soon dimmed. Since 1992, the voices of authoritarianism and nationalism have grown stronger, both inside and outside of Boris Yeltsin's government. Russia is again showing its teeth, and turning away from the United States.

Americans must recognize that the Cold War is not over. We must understand that our interests and the interests of Russia will inevitably conflict. Despite the current lull in hostilities, a resurgent Russia will sooner or later threaten U.S. security. The United States and Russia will again be battling for influence in Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia. The simple fact is that a strong Russia should not be welcomed by the United States. Rather than helping Russia renew its economic and military competition with the United States, we should take steps to declaw the Russian bear. Limiting Russia's military power, especially its nuclear forces, should be our primary goal. We should also help the non-Russian states of the FSU resist Moscow's efforts to restore the Soviet empire. The collapse of the Soviet Union has given us a head start in preparing for the next round of the Cold War. Let us not squander our lead.

## What policies should we pursue?

- The United States should provide aid to Ukraine, Georgia, and other FSU countries seeking to break the domination of Russia.
- The United States should promote American investment in the development of the Caspian Sea Basin's energy resources and block Russian efforts to control the region.
- The United States should oppose further IMF loans to Russia.
- The United States should press forward quickly with the expansion of NATO into Central Europe.
- The United States should apply trade sanctions against Russia to pressure Moscow to dismantle its nuclear arsenal.
- The United States should block Russian membership in the Group of Seven (G-7), the World Trade Organization, and other international organizations until Moscow stops its repression of Chechnya.

## Lessons from the Cold War

The Cold War went much deeper than the conflict between communism and free-market democracy. Rather, the struggle was rooted in the conflicting national interests of the United States and Russia. Geography divided our two countries from the outset. Protected on two sides by great oceans, U.S. leaders approached the issue of security with a very different perspective from that of their nearly landlocked counterparts in Moscow. The contrasting national characters of the two peoples also help to explain the hostility of the Cold War. Our country's free-market economic system is a reflection of American values, while Soviet communism grew out of Russian traditions. Obviously, these divisions have not disappeared with the end of the Cold War.

## PROS SUPPORTING ARGUMENTS

1. Limiting Russia's military power will reduce the security fears of Russia's neighbors, as well as those of our allies in Western Europe and East Asia, and contribute to international peace and stability.

&

2. Burying our heads in the sand as Russia recovers its military strength and restores its empire will leave the United States to confront a much more powerful foe in the future.

3. Offering firm security guarantees to Russia's neighbors will make it clear that Russia will pay dearly for any attempt to restore its empire by force.

## CONS OPPOSING ARGUMENTS

1. Taking a hostile stance toward Russia will bring progress on nuclear arms control to a halt, close the door on Russian cooperation to control international nuclear smuggling, and increase international tensions to dangerous levels.

2. Supporting the non-Russian states of the FSU at Russia's expense will turn the world's largest country into a bitter enemy of the United States, and fuel hostility between Russia and its neighbors.

3. Defining Russia as our enemy will doom democratic, free-market reforms and lend support to the cause of communists and nationalists seeking to gain power.

4. Encouraging the non-Russian countries of the FSU to distance themselves from Russia will further weaken trade links among the FSU countries and worsen economic conditions for all.

Option 4

# MIND OUR OWN BUSINESS

For forty years, the Cold War not only dominated U.S. foreign policy, but also took precedence over vital concerns here at home. The United States poured hundreds of billions of dollars into military research while our schools crumbled. More than half a million U.S. troops were stationed overseas while crime, homelessness, and the budget deficit increased in our country. Now that the Cold War is over, it's time to put our national priorities back in order. Undeniably, the problems facing Russia are severe. However, the country is much too large and complex for the United States to significantly influence its direction. Ultimately, the future of Russia and its neighbors will be decided by the people of the region. The Russians understand their problems and limitations well. There may be frustration and disappointment in the country, but few Russians suggest that their country should reignite the Cold War with the United States. Despite the exaggerated warnings of alarmists in the United States, Russia is not a threat to our security.

Rather than searching for new entanglements overseas, the United States should strive to limit its involvement in the FSU. Recent events have made clear the foolishness of promoting experimental reform programs or sticking our nose into disputes between Russia and its neighbors. The next few years will be crucial to the future of the United States. Historic challenges await us as we struggle to reduce our budget deficit, address poverty and crime, and tackle other long neglected problems. We cannot allow our concentration to be distracted by another foreign policy crusade. We have done our part to make the world a better place. Now let us turn our attention to revitalizing the United States.

## What policies should we pursue?

- The United States should provide only humanitarian relief aid to the FSU.
- The United States should press Russia to lower its trade barriers in exchange for greater access to the American market.
- The United States should cancel plans to expand NATO and scale back the U.S. military presence in Europe.
- The United States should continue to respect current nuclear arms control agreements with Russia.
- The United States should maintain a neutral position toward disputes between Russia and its neighbors.
- The United States should work with Russia through the United Nations to control the spread of nuclear weapons and nuclear smuggling.

## Lessons from the Cold War

The collapse of the Soviet Union should serve as a warning to Americans. The Soviets were stretched thin by their senseless overseas commitments and the burden of their enormous military. Ultimately, the demands of Soviet foreign policy overwhelmed the capacity of the society. The United States was fortunate to outlast the Soviet Union. However, we have suffered from the same exaggerated emphasis on foreign policy that brought down the Soviet empire. The Cold War put both superpowers on the path to self-destruction. Unless we change, we are only a few steps behind our former enemies.

## PROS — SUPPORTING ARGUMENTS

1. By not taking sides in Russian politics, the United States will avoid becoming a target for blame if economic reforms fail.

2. If we step aside, other countries will take the lead in aiding Russia and we will no longer need to play the role of global policeman.

&

3. Foreign aid to Russia will likely fall into the hands of hard-line officials and corrupt bureaucrats, thus strengthening the forces opposed to reform.

## CONS — OPPOSING ARGUMENTS

1. By turning our back on reformers in Russia, the United States will lose its position of leadership in promoting democracy and the free-market economic system around the world.

2. By not participating in aid programs now, the United States will find itself cut out of future opportunities for trade and investment in Russia.

3. Saving a few dollars today on aid to the FSU will seem short-sighted tomorrow if we must spend tens of billions more to defend ourselves from a hostile Russia.

4. Standing by idly while Russia reasserts its domination over the other states of the FSU will feed Russia's expansionist instincts.

# Focusing Your Thoughts

*Instructions:* You have had an opportunity to consider four options on U.S. policy toward Russia. Now it is your turn to look at each of the options from your own perspective. Try each one on for size. Think about how the options address your concerns and hopes. You will find that each has its own risks and trade-offs, advantages and disadvantages. After you complete this worksheet, you will be asked to develop your own option on this issue.

### *Ranking the Options*

Which of the options below do you prefer? Rank the options, with "1" being the best option for the United States to follow.

___ **Option 1: Guide Russia Forward**

___ **Option 2: Keep the Lid On**

___ **Option 3: Declaw the Russian Bear**

___ **Option 4: Mind Our Own Business**

### *Beliefs*

Rate each of the statements below according to your personal beliefs:

1 = Strongly Support
2 = Support
3 = Oppose
4 = Strongly Oppose
5 = Undecided

___ The greatest threats facing the United States are all at home: budget deficits, mediocre schools, crime, and an inadequate health care system.

___ Our most trustworthy allies are those countries that share our democratic principles and free-market economic system.

___ Geography and culture largely determine which countries are enemies of the United States.

___ Trying to make deep changes in other societies is naive and dangerous.

___ The main foreign policy interests of the United States lie in preserving stability and order around the world.

___ We will always have to compete with other nations for power.

___ Every country, even one emerging from communism, is capable of transforming itself into a free-market democracy.

___ The end of the Cold War has made the world a more dangerous place.

### *Creating Your Own Option*

Your next assignment is to create an option that reflects your own beliefs and opinions. You may borrow heavily from one option, or you may combine ideas from two or three options. Or you may take a new approach altogether. There are, of course, no perfect solutions. And there is no right or wrong answer. Rather, you should strive to craft an option that is logical and persuasive. Be careful of contradictions. For example, you should not invite Russia's neighbors to join NATO, while leaving Russia out, if you want to promote cooperation between the United States and Russia.

# Supplementary Documents

## The Sources of Soviet Conduct
## By "X"

*(This article, authored by George F. Kennan, is based on the 1946 memorandum in which Kennan proposed that the United States aim to contain the expansion of Soviet communism. The article appeared in* Foreign Affairs *in July 1947.)*

The political personality of Soviet power as we know it today is the product of ideology and circumstances: ideology inherited by the present Soviet leaders from the movement in which they had their political origin, and circumstances of the power which they now have exercised for nearly three decades in Russia. There can be few tasks of psychological analysis more difficult than to try to trace the interaction of these two forces and the relative role of each in the determination of official Soviet conduct. Yet the attempt must be made if that conduct is to be understood and effectively countered.

It is difficult to summarize the set of ideological concepts with which the Soviet leaders came into power. Marxian ideology, in its Russian-Communist projection, has always been in process of subtle evolution. The materials on which it bases itself are extensive and complex. But the outstanding features of Communist thought as it existed in 1916 may perhaps be summarized as follows: (a) that the central factor in the life of man, the factor which determines the character of public life and the "physiognomy of society," is the system by which material goods are produced and exchanged; (b) that the capitalist system of production is a nefarious one which inevitably leads to the exploitation of the working class by the capital-owning class and is incapable of developing adequately the economic resources of society or of distributing fairly the material goods produced by human labor; (c) that capitalism contains the seeds of its own destruction and must, in view of the inability of the capital-owning class to adjust itself to economic change, result eventually and inescapably in a revolutionary transfer of power to the working class; and (d) that imperialism, the final phase of capitalism, leads directly to war and revolution.

The rest may be outlined in Lenin's own words: "Unevenness of economic and political development is the inflexible law of capitalism. It follows from this that the victory of Socialism may come originally in a few capitalist countries or even in a single capitalist country. The victorious proletariat of that country, having expropriated the capitalists and having organized Socialist production at home, would rise against the remaining capitalist world, drawing to itself in the process the oppressed classes of other countries."[1] It must be noted that there was no assumption that capitalism would perish without proletarian revolution. A final push was needed from a revolutionary proletariat movement in order to tip over the tottering structure. But it was regarded as inevitable that sooner or later that push would be given.

For 50 years prior to the outbreak of the Revolution, this pattern of thought had exercised great fascination for the members of the Russian revolutionary movement. Frustrated, discontented, hopeless of finding self-expression — or too impatient to seek it — in the confining limits of the Tsarist political system, yet lacking wide popular support for their choice of bloody revolution as a means of social betterment, these revolutionists found in Marxist theory a highly convenient rationalization for their own instinctive desires. It afforded pseudo-scientific justification for their impatience, for their categoric denial of all value in the Tsarist system, for their yearning for power and revenge and for their inclination to cut corners in the pursuit of it. It is therefore no wonder that they had come to believe implicitly in the truth and soundness of the Marxian-Leninist teachings, so congenial to their own impulses and emotions. Their sincerity need not be impugned. This is a phenomenon as old as human nature itself. It has never been more aptly described than by Edward Gibbon, who wrote in *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire:* "From enthusiasm to imposture the step is perilous and slippery; the demon of Socrates affords a memorable instance how a wise man may deceive himself, how a good man may deceive others, how the conscious may slumber in a mixed and middle state between self-illusion and voluntary fraud." And it was with this set of conceptions

that the members of the Bolshevik Party entered into power.

Now it must be noted that through all the years of preparation for revolution, the attention of these men, as indeed for Marx himself, had been centered less on the future form which Socialism[2] would take than on the necessary overthrow of rival power which, in their view, had to precede the introduction of Socialism. Their views, therefore, on the positive program to be put into effect, once power was attained, were for the most part nebulous, visionary and impractical. Beyond the nationalization of industry and the expropriation of large, private capital holdings, there was no agreed program. The treatment of the peasantry, which according to the Marxist formulation was not of the proletariat, had always been a vague spot in the pattern of Communist thought; and it remained an object of controversy and vacillation for the first ten years of Communist power.

The circumstances of the immediate post-revolution period — the existence in Russia of civil war and foreign intervention, together with the obvious facts that the Communists represented only a tiny minority of the Russian people — made the establishment of dictatorial power a necessity. The experiment with "war Communism" and the abrupt attempt to eliminate private production and trade had unfortunate economic consequences and caused further bitterness against the new revolutionary regime. While the temporary relaxation of the effort to communize Russia, represented by the New Economic Policy, alleviated some of this economic distress and thereby served its purpose, it also made it evident that the "capitalistic sector of society" was still prepared to profit at once from any relaxation of governmental pressure, and would, if permitted to continue to exist, always constitute a powerful opposing element to the Soviet regime and a serious rival for influence in the country. Somewhat the same situation prevailed with respect to the individual peasant who, in his own small way, was also a private producer.

Lenin, had he lived, might have proved a great enough man to reconcile these conflicting forces to the ultimate benefit of Russian society, though this is questionable. But be that as it may, Stalin, and those whom he led in the struggle for succession to Lenin's position of leadership, were not the men to tolerate rival political forces in the sphere of power which they coveted. Their sense of insecurity was too great. Their particular brand of fanaticism, unmodified by any of the Anglo-Saxon traditions of compromise, was too fierce and too jealous to envisage any permanent sharing power. From the Russian-Asiatic world out of which they had emerged they carried with them a skepticism as to the possibilities of permanent and peaceful coexistence of rival forces. Easily persuaded of their own doctrinaire "rightness," they insisted on the submission or destruction of all competing power. Outside of the Communist Party, Russian society was to have no rigidity. There were to be no forms of collective human activity or association which would not be dominated by the Party. No other force in Russian society was to be permitted to achieve vitality or integrity. Only the Party was to have structure. All else was to be an amorphous mass.

And within the Party the same principle was to apply. The mass of Party members might go through the motions of election, deliberation, decision and action; but in these motions they were to be animated not by their own individual wills but by the awesome breath of the Party leadership and the overbrooding presence of "the word."

Let it be stressed again that subjectively these men probably did not seek absolutism for its own sake. They doubtless believed — and found it easy to believe — that they alone knew what was good for society and that they would accomplish that good once their power was secure and unchallengeable. But in seeking that security of their own rule they were prepared to recognize no restrictions, either of God or man, on the character of their methods. And until such time as that security might be achieved, they placed far down on their scale of operational priorities the comforts and happiness of the peoples entrusted to their care.

Now the outstanding circumstance concerning the Soviet regime is that down to the present day this process of political consolidation has never been completed and the men in the Kremlin have continued to be predominantly absorbed with the struggle to secure and make absolute the power which they seized in November 1917. They have endeavored to secure it primarily against forces at home, within Soviet society itself. But they have also endeavored to secure it against the outside world. For ideology, as we have seen, taught them that the outside world was hostile and that it was their duty eventually to overthrow the

political forces beyond their borders. The powerful hands of Russian history and tradition reached up to sustain them in this feeling. Finally, their own aggressive intransigence with respect to the outside world began to find its own reaction; and they were soon forced, to use another Gibbonesque phrase, "to chastise the contumacy" which they themselves had provoked. It is an undeniable privilege of every man to prove himself right in the thesis that the world is his enemy; for if he reiterates it frequently enough and makes it the background of his conduct he is bound eventually to be right.

Now it lies in the nature of the mental world of the Soviet leaders, as well as in the character of their ideology, that no opposition to them can be officially recognized as having any merit or justification whatsoever. Such opposition can flow, in theory, only from the hostile and incorrigible forces of dying capitalism. As long as remnants of capitalism were officially recognized as existing in Russia, it was possible to place on them, as an internal element, part of the blame for the maintenance of a dictatorial form of society. But as these remnants were liquidated, little by little, this justification fell away; and when it was indicated officially that they had been finally destroyed, it disappeared altogether. And this fact created one of the most basic of the compulsions which came to act upon the Soviet regime: since capitalism no longer existed in Russia and since it could not be admitted that there could be serious or widespread opposition to the Kremlin springing spontaneously from the liberated masses under its authority, it became necessary to justify the retention of the dictatorship by stressing the menace of capitalism abroad.

This began at an early date. In 1924 Stalin specifically defended the retention of the "organs of suppression," meaning, among others, the army and the secret police, on the ground that "as long as there is a capitalist encirclement there will be danger of intervention with all the consequences that flow from that danger." In accordance with that theory, and from that time on, all internal opposition forces in Russia have consistently been portrayed as the agents of foreign forces of reaction antagonistic to Soviet power.

By the same token, tremendous emphasis has been placed on the original Communist thesis of a basic antagonism between the capitalist and Socialist worlds. It is clear, from many indications, that this emphasis is not founded in reality. The real facts concerning it have been confused by the existence abroad of genuine resentment provoked by Soviet philosophy and tactics and occasionally by the existence of great centers of military power, notably the Nazi regime in Germany and the Japanese Government of the late 1930's, which did indeed have aggressive designs against the Soviet Union. But there is ample evidence that the stress laid in Moscow on the menace confronting Soviet society from the world outside its borders is founded not in the realities of foreign antagonism but in the necessity of explaining away the maintenance of dictatorial authority at home.

Now the maintenance of this pattern of Soviet power, namely, the pursuit of unlimited authority domestically, accompanied by the cultivation of the semi-myth of implacable foreign hostility, has gone far to shape the actual machinery of Soviet power as we know it today. Internal organs of administration which did not serve this purpose withered on the vine. Organs which did serve this purpose became vastly swollen. The security of Soviet power came to rest on the iron discipline of the Party, on the severity and ubiquity of the secret police, and on the uncompromising economic monopolism of the state. The "organs of suppression," in which the Soviet leaders had sought security from rival forces, became in large measure the master of those whom they were designed to serve. Today the major part of the structure of Soviet power is committed to the perfection of the dictatorship and to the maintenance of the concept of Russia as in a state of siege, with the enemy lowering beyond the walls. And the millions of human beings who form that part of the structure of power must defend at all costs this concept of Russia's position, for without it, they are themselves superfluous.

As things stand today, the rulers can no longer dream of parting with these organs of suppression. The quest for absolute power, pursued now for nearly three decades with a ruthlessness unparalleled (in scope at least) in modern times, has again produced internally, as it did externally, its own reaction. The excesses of the police apparatus have fanned the potential opposition to the regime into something far greater and more dangerous than it could have been before those excesses began.

But least of all can the rulers dispense with the fiction by which the maintenance of dictatorial power

has been defended. For this fiction has been canonized in Soviet philosophy by the excesses already committed in its name; and it is now anchored in the Soviet structure of thought by bonds far greater than those of mere ideology.

## II

So much for the historical background. What does it spell in terms of the political personality of Soviet power as we know it today?

Of the original ideology, nothing has been officially junked. Belief is maintained in the basic badness of capitalism, in the inevitability of its destruction, in the obligation of the proletariat to assist in that destruction and to take power into its own hands. But stress has come to be laid primarily on those concepts which relate most specifically to the Soviet regime itself: to its position as the sole truly Socialist regime in a dark and misguided world, and to the relationships of power within it.

The first of these concepts is that of the innate antagonism between capitalism and Socialism. We have seen how deeply that concept has become imbedded in foundations of Soviet power. It has profound implications for Russia's conduct as a member of international society. It means that there can never be on Moscow's side any sincere assumption of a community of aims between the Soviet Union and powers which are regarded as capitalist. It must invariably be assumed in Moscow that the aims of the capitalist world are antagonistic to the Soviet regime, and therefore to the interests of the peoples it controls. If the Soviet Government occasionally sets its signature to documents which would indicate the contrary, this is to be regarded as a tactical manoeuvre permissible in dealing with the enemy (who is without honor) and should be taken in the spirit of *caveat emptor*. Basically, the antagonism remains. It is postulated. And from it flow many of the phenomena which we find disturbing in the Kremlin's conduct of foreign policy: the secretiveness, the lack of frankness, the duplicity, the wary suspiciousness, and the basic unfriendliness of purpose. These phenomena are there to stay, for the foreseeable future. There can be variations of degree and of emphasis. When there is something the Russians want from us, one or the other of these features of their policy may be thrust temporarily into the background; and when that happens there will always be Americans who will leap forward with gleeful announcements that "the Russians have changed," and some who will even try to take credit for having brought about such "changes." But we should not be misled by tactical manoeuvres. These characteristics of Soviet policy, like the postulate from which they flow, are basic to the internal nature of Soviet power, and will be with us, whether in the foreground or the background, until the internal nature of Soviet power is changed.

This means that we are going to continue for a long time to find the Russians difficult to deal with. It does not mean that they should be considered as embarked upon a do-or-die program to overthrow our society by a given date. The theory of the inevitability of the eventual fall of capitalism has the fortunate connotation that there is no hurry about it. The forces of progress can take their time in preparing for the final *coup de grace*. Meanwhile, what is vital is that the "Socialist fatherland" — that oasis of power which has been already won for Socialism in the person of the Soviet Union — should be cherished and defended by all good Communists at home and abroad, its fortunes promoted, its enemies badgered and confounded. The promotion of premature, "adventuristic" revolutionary projects abroad which might embarrass Soviet power in any way would be an inexcusable, even a counter-revolutionary act. The cause of Socialism is the support and promotion of Soviet power, as defined in Moscow.

This brings us to the second of the concepts important to contemporary Soviet outlook. That is the infallibility of the Kremlin. The Soviet concept of power, which permits no focal points of organization outside the Party itself, requires that the Party leadership remain in theory the sole repository of truth. For if truth were to be found elsewhere, there would be justification for its expression in organized activity. But it is precisely that which the Kremlin cannot and will not permit.

The leadership of the Communist Party is therefore always right, and has been always right ever since in 1929 Stalin formalized his personal power by announcing that decisions of the Politburo were being taken unanimously.

On the principle of infallibility there rests the iron discipline of the Communist Party. In fact, the two

concepts are mutually self-supporting. Perfect discipline requires recognition of infallibility. Infallibility requires the observance of discipline. And the two together go far to determine the behaviorism of the entire Soviet apparatus of power. But their effect cannot be understood unless a third factor be taken into account: namely, the fact that the leadership is at liberty to put forward for tactical purposes any particular thesis which it finds useful to the cause at any particular moment and to require the faithful and unquestioning acceptance of that thesis by the members of the movement as a whole. This means that truth is not a constant but is actually created, for all intents and purposes, by the Soviet leaders themselves. It may vary from week to week, from month to month. It is nothing absolute and immutable — nothing which flows from objective reality. It is only the most recent manifestation of the wisdom of those in whom the ultimate wisdom is supposed to reside, because they represent the logic of history. The accumulative affect of these factors is to give to the whole subordinate apparatus of Soviet power an unshakable stubbornness and steadfastness in its orientation. This orientation can be changed at will by the Kremlin but by no other power. Once a given party line has been laid down on a given issue of current policy, the whole Soviet governmental machine, including the mechanism of diplomacy, moves inexorably along the prescribed path, like a persistent toy automobile wound up and headed in a given direction, stopping only when it meets with some unanswerable force. The individuals who are the components of this machine are not amenable to arguments or reason which comes to them from outside sources. Their whole training has taught them to mistrust and discount the glib persuasiveness of the outside world. Like the white dog before the phonograph, they hear only the "master's voice." And if they are to be called off from the purposes last dictated to them, it is the master who must call them off. Thus the foreign representative cannot hope that his words will make any impression on them. The most that he can hope is that they will be transmitted to those at the top, who are capable of changing the party line. But even those are not likely to be swayed by any normal logic in the words of the bourgeois representative. Since there can be no appeal to common purposes, there can be no appeal to common mental approaches. For this reason, facts speak louder than words to the ears of the Kremlin; and words carry the greatest weight when they have the ring of reflecting, or being backed up by, facts of unchallengeable validity.

But we have seen that the Kremlin is under no ideological compulsion to accomplish its purposes in a hurry. Like the Church, it is dealing in ideological concepts which are of long-term validity, and it can afford to be patient. It has no right to risk the existing achievements of the revolution for the sake of vain baubles of the future. The very teachings of Lenin himself require great caution and flexibility in the pursuit of Communist purposes. Again, these precepts are fortified by the lessons of Russian history: of centuries of obscure battles between nomadic forces over the stretches of a vast unfortified plain. Here caution, circumspection, flexibility, and deception are the valuable qualities, and their value finds natural appreciation in the Russian or the oriental mind. Thus the Kremlin has no compunction about retreating in the face of a superior force. And being under the compulsion of no timetable, it does not get panicky under the necessity for such retreat. Its political action is a fluid stream which moves constantly, wherever it is permitted to move, toward a given goal. Its main concern is to make sure that it has filled every nook and cranny available to it in the basin of world power. But if it finds unassailable barriers in its path, it accepts these philosophically and accommodates itself to them. The main thing is that there should always be pressure, unceasing constant pressure, toward the desired goal. There is no trace of any feeling in Soviet psychology that that goal must be reached at any given time.

These considerations make Soviet diplomacy at once easier and more difficult to deal with than the diplomacy of individual aggressive leaders like Napoleon and Hitler. On the one hand it is more sensitive to contrary force, more ready to yield on individual sectors of the diplomatic front when that force is felt to be too strong, and thus more rational in the logic and rhetoric of power. On the other hand it cannot be easily defeated or discouraged by a single victory on the part of its opponents. And the patient persistence by which it is animated means that it can be effectively countered not by sporadic acts which represent the momentary whims of democratic opinion but only by intelligent long-range policies on the part of Russia's adversaries — policies no less steady in their purpose, and no less variegated and

resourceful in their application, than those of the Soviet Union itself.

In these circumstances it is clear that the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies. It is important to note, however, that such a policy has nothing to do with outward histrionics: with threats or blustering or superfluous gestures of outward "toughness." While the Kremlin is basically flexible in its reaction to political realities, it is by no means unamenable to the considerations of prestige. Like most any other government, it can be placed by tactless and threatening gestures in a position where it cannot afford to yield even though this might be dictated by its sense of realism. The Russian leaders are keen judges of human psychology, and as such they are highly conscious that loss of temper and self-control is never a source of strength in political affairs. They are quick to exploit such evidences of weakness. For these reasons, it is a *sine qua non* of successful dealing with Russia that the foreign government in question should remain at all times cool and collected and that its demands on Russian policy should be put forward in such a manner as to leave the way open for a compliance not too detrimental to Russia prestige.

## III

In the light of the above, it will be clearly seen that the Soviet pressure against the free institutions of the western world is something that can be contained by the adroit and vigilant application of counter-force at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and manoeuvres of Soviet policy, but which cannot be charmed or talked out of existence. The Russians look forward to a duel of infinite duration, and they see that already they have scored great successes. It must be borne in mind that there was a time when the Communist Party represented far more of a minority in the sphere of Russian national life than Soviet power today represents in the world community.

But if ideology convinces the rulers of Russia that truth is on their side and that they can therefore afford to wait, those of us on whom that ideology has no claim are free to examine objectively the validity of that premise. The Soviet thesis not only implies complete lack of control by the west over its own economic destiny, it likewise assumes Russian unity, discipline and patience over an infinite period. Let us bring this apocalyptic vision down to earth, and suppose that the western world finds the strength and resourcefulness to contain Soviet power over a period of ten to fifteen years. What does that spell for Russia itself?

The Soviet leaders, taking advantage of the contributions of modern technique to the arts of despotism, have solved the question of obedience within the confines of their power. Few challenge their authority; and even those who do are unable to make that challenge valid as against the organs of suppression of the state.

The Kremlin has also proved able to accomplish its purpose of building up in Russia, regardless of the interests of the inhabitants, an industrial foundation of heavy metallurgy, which is, to be sure, not yet complete but which is nevertheless continuing to grow and is approaching those of the other major industrial countries. All of this, however, both the maintenance of internal political security and the building of heavy industry, has been carried out at a terrible cost in human life and in human hopes and energies. It has necessitated the use of forced labor on a scale unprecedented in modern times under conditions of peace. It has involved the neglect or abuse of other phases of Soviet economic life, particularly agriculture, consumers' goods production, housing and transportation.

To all that, the war has added its tremendous toll of destruction, death and human exhaustion. In consequence of this, we have in Russia today a population which is physically and spiritually tired. The mass of people are disillusioned, skeptical and no longer as accessible as they once were to the magical attraction which Soviet power still radiates to its followers abroad. The avidity with which the people seized upon the slight respite accorded to the Church for tactical reasons during the war was eloquent testimony to the fact that their capacity for faith and devotion found little expression in the purposes of the regime.

In these circumstances, there are limits to the physical and nervous strength of people themselves. These limits are absolute ones, and are binding even for the cruelest dictatorship, because beyond them people cannot be driven. The forced labor camps and the other agencies of constraint provide temporary means of compelling people to work longer hours than

their own volition or mere economic pressure would dictate; but if people survive them at all they become old before their time and must be considered as human casualties to the demands of dictatorship. In either case their best powers are no longer available to society and can no longer be enlisted in the service of the state.

Here only the younger generation can help. The younger generation, despite all vicissitudes and sufferings, is numerous and vigorous, and the Russians are a talented people. But it still remains to be seen what will be the effects on mature performance of the abnormal emotional strains of childhood which Soviet dictatorship created and which were enormously increased by the war. Such things as normal security and placidity of home environment have practically ceased to exist in the Soviet Union outside of the most remote farms and villages. And observers are not yet sure whether that is not going to leave its mark on the overall capacity of the generation now coming into maturity.

In addition to this, we have the fact that Soviet economic development, while it can list certain formidable achievements, has been precariously spotty and uneven. Russia Communists who speak of the "uneven development of capitalism" should blush at the contemplation of their own national economy. Here certain branches of economic life, such as the metallurgical and machine industries, have been pushed out of all proportion to other sectors of the economy. Here is a nation striving to become in a short period of time one of the great industrialized nations of the world while it still has no highway network worthy of the name and only a relatively primitive network of railways. Much has been done to increase efficiency of labor and to teach primitive peasants something about the operation of machines. But maintenance is still a crying deficiency of all Soviet economy. Construction is hasty and poor in quality. Depreciation must be enormous. And in vast sectors of economic life it has not yet been possible to instill into labor anything like that general culture of production and technical self-respect which characterizes the skilled workers of the west.

It is difficult to see how these deficiencies can be corrected at an early date by a tired and dispirited population working largely under the shadow of fear and compulsion. And as long as they are not overcome, Russia will remain economically a vulnerable, and in a certain sense an impotent, nation, capable of exporting its enthusiasms and radiating the strange charm of its primitive political vitality but unable to back up those articles of export by the real evidences of material power and prosperity.

Meanwhile, a great uncertainty hangs over the political life of the Soviet Union. That is the uncertainty involved in the transfer of power from one individual or group of individuals to others.

This is, of course, outstandingly the problem of the personal position of Stalin. We must remember that his succession to Lenin's preeminence in the Communist movement was the only such transfer of individual authority which the Soviet Union has experienced. That transfer took 12 years to consolidate. It cost the lives of millions of people and shook the state to its foundations. The attendant tremors were felt all through the international revolutionary movement, to the disadvantage of the Kremlin itself.

It is always possible that another transfer of preeminent power may take place quietly and inconspicuously, with no repercussions anywhere. But again, it is possible that the questions involved may unleash, to use some of Lenin's words, one of those "incredibly swift transitions" from "delicate deceit" to "wild violence" which characterize Russian history, and may shake Soviet power to its foundations.

But this is not only a question of Stalin himself. There has been, since 1938, a dangerous congealment of political life in the higher circles of Soviet power. The All-Union Congress of Soviets, in theory the supreme body of the Party, is supposed to meet not less often than once in three years. It will soon be eight full years since its last meeting. During this period membership in the Party has numerically doubled. Party mortality during the war was enormous; and today well over half of the Party members are persons who have entered since the last Party congress was held. Meanwhile, the same small group of men has carried on at the top through an amazing series of national vicissitudes. Surely there is some reason why the experiences of the war brought basic political changes to every one of the great governments of the west. Surely the causes of that phenomenon are basic enough to be present somewhere in the obscurity of Soviet political life, as well. And yet no recognition has been given to these causes in Russia.

It must be surmised from this that even within so

highly disciplined an organization as the Communist Party there must be a growing divergence in an age, outlook and interest between the great mass of Party members, only so recently recruited into the movement, and the little self-perpetuating clique of men at the top, whom most of these party members have never met, with whom they have never conversed, and with whom they can have no political intimacy.

Who can say whether, in these circumstances, the eventual rejuvenation of higher spheres of authority (which can only be a matter of time) can take place smoothly and peacefully, or whether rivals in the quest for higher power will not eventually reach down into these politically immature and inexperienced masses in order to find support for their respective claims? If this were ever to happen, strange consequences could flow for the Communist Party: for membership at large has been exercised only in practices of iron discipline and obedience and not in the arts of compromise and accommodation. And if disunity were ever to seize and paralyze the Party, the chaos and weakness of Russian society would be revealed in forms beyond description. For we have seen that Soviet power is only a crust concealing an amorphous mass of human beings among whom no independent organizational structure is tolerated. In Russia there is not even such a thing as local government. The present generation of Russians have never known spontaneity of collective action. If, consequently, anything were ever to occur to disrupt the unity and efficacy of the Party as a political instrument, Soviet Russia might be changed overnight from one of the strongest to one of the weakest and most pitiable of national societies.

Thus the future of Soviet power may not be by any means as secure as Russian capacity for self-delusion would make it appear to the men in the Kremlin. That they can keep power themselves, they have demonstrated. That they can quietly and easily turn it over to others remains to be proved. Meanwhile, the hardships of their rule and the vicissitudes of international life have taken a heavy toll of the strength and hopes of the great people on whom their power rests. It is curious to note that the ideological power of Soviet authority is strongest today in areas beyond the frontiers of Russia, beyond the reach of its police power. This phenomenon brings to mind a comparison used by Thomas Mann in his great novel *Buddenbrooks*. Observing that human institutions often show the greatest outward brilliance at a moment when inner decay is in reality farther advanced, he compared the Buddenbrook family, in the days of its greatest glamour, to one of those stars whose light shines most brilliantly on this world when in reality it has long since ceased to exist. And who can say with assurance that the strong light still cast by the Kremlin on the dissatisfied peoples of the western world is not the powerful afterglow of a constellation which is in actuality on the wane? This cannot be proved. And it cannot be disproved. But the possibility remains (and in the opinion of this writer it is a strong one) that Soviet power, like the capitalist world of its conception, bears within it the seeds of its own decay, and that the sprouting of these seeds is well advanced.

## IV

It is clear that the United States cannot expect in the foreseeable future to enjoy political intimacy with the Soviet regime. It must continue to regard the Soviet Union as a rival, not a partner, in the political arena. It must continue to expect that Soviet policies will reflect no abstract love of peace and stability, no real faith in the possibility of a permanent happy coexistence of the Socialist and capitalistic worlds, but rather a cautious, persistent pressure toward the disruption and weakening of all rival influence and rival power.

Balanced against this are the facts that Russia, as opposed to the western world in general, is still by far the weaker party, that Soviet policy is highly flexible, and that Soviet society may well contain deficiencies which will eventually weaken its own total potential. This would of itself warrant the United States entering with reasonable confidence upon a policy of firm containment, designed to confront the Russians with unalterable counter-force at every point where they show signs of encroaching upon the interests of a peaceful and stable world.

But in actuality the possibility for American policy are by no means limited to holding the line and hoping for the best. It is entirely possible for the United States to influence by its actions the internal developments, both within Russia and throughout the international Communist movement, by which Russian policy is largely determined. This is not only a question of the modest measure of informational

activity which this government can conduct in the Soviet Union and elsewhere, although that, too, is important. It is rather a question of the degree to which the United States can create among the peoples of the world generally the impression of a country which knows what it wants, which is coping successfully with the problems of its internal life and with the responsibilities of a World Power, and which has a spiritual vitality capable of holding its own among the major ideological currents of the time. To the extent that such an impression can be created and maintained, the aims of Russian Communism must appear sterile and quixotic, the hopes and enthusiasm of Moscow's supporters must wane, and added strain must be imposed on the Kremlin's foreign policies. For the palsied decrepitude of the capitalist world is the keystone of Communist philosophy. Even the failure of the United States to experience the early economic depression which the ravens of the Red Square have been predicting with such complacent confidence since hostilities ceased would have deep and important repercussions throughout the Communist world.

By the same token, exhibitions in indecision, disunity and internal disintegration within this country have an exhilarating effect on the whole Communist movement. At each evidence of these tendencies, a thrill of hope and excitement goes through the Communist world; a new jauntiness can be noted in the Moscow tread; new groups of foreign supporters climb on to what they can only view as the bandwagon of international politics; and Russian pressure increases all along the line in international affairs.

It would be an exaggeration to say that American behavior unassisted and alone could exercise a power of life and death over the Communist movement and bring about the early fall of Soviet power in Russia. But the United States has it in its power to increase enormously the strains under which Soviet policy must operate, to force upon the Kremlin a far greater degree of moderation and circumspection than it has had to observe in recent years, and in this way to promote tendencies which must eventually find their outlet in either the break-up or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power. For no mystical, Messianic movement — and particularly not that of the Kremlin — can face frustration indefinitely without eventually adjusting itself in one way or another to the logic of that state of affairs.

Thus the decision will really fall in large measure in this country itself. The issue of Soviet-American relations is in essence a test of the over-all worth of the United states as a nation among nations. To avoid destruction the United States need only measure up to its own best traditions and prove itself worthy of preservation as a great nation.

Surely, there was never a fairer test of national quality than this. In the light of these circumstances, the thoughtful observer of Russian-American relations will find no cause for complaint in the Kremlin's challenge to American society. He will rather experience a certain gratitude to a Providence which, by providing the American people with this implacable challenge, has made their entire security as a nation dependent on their pulling themselves together and accepting the responsibilities of moral and political leadership that history plainly intended them to bear.

**Notes**

[1] "Concerning the Slogans of the United States of Europe," August 1915. Official Soviet edition of Lenin's works.

[2] Here and elsewhere in this paper "Socialism" refers to Marxist or Leninist Communism, not to liberal Socialism of the Second International variety.

# The Challenge of Change in Russia

## Anthony Lake, assistant to the president for national security affairs

*(The speech below, given on April 1, 1996, to the U.S.-Russia Business Council, represents a summary of the Clinton administration's policy toward Russia and its former Soviet neighbors.)*

I wanted to join you today...because few issues on America's foreign policy agenda are as critical or as challenging as our relations with Russia....This is an important time to remember why staying engaged with Russia is in America's national interests.

Consider first the world that we live in today. Halfway between the end of the Cold War and the dawn of a new century, our nation is at peace. Our economy is strong. The tide of market democracy is rising around the world bringing freedom and the hope of prosperity to more people than ever before in human history. And all of this provides new opportunities for us.

But this promising new era is not by any means risk-free. Old threats like aggression by rogue states have taken on new and dangerous forms. And a host of modern threats from nuclear proliferation, to terrorism, to the growth of international crime, ignore national borders, and they undermine our national security. So, in this new age of possibility, but also of peril, American leadership is more important than ever before. The world may have radically changed, but our basic mission in the world has not.

In many regions, the roots of the democratic society — pluralism, tolerance, liberty — are not yet firm. Now, as before, our special role in the world is to safeguard and strengthen the community of democracies and of open markets, and nowhere is that mission more vital than in Russia.

After more than four decades of nuclear peril, of communist repression that trampled the rights and shackled the potential of people throughout the Soviet empire, or superpower rivalry from Angola to Vietnam, the state that was once our fiercest opponent is now moving toward market democracy.

Helping Russia succeed in this is deeply, profoundly in our national interest. A stable, democratic-oriented, market-oriented Russia would be far less likely to threaten America's security and far more likely to work with us to solve global problems. It can be an important partner in prosperity, with 150 million new consumers for American products. It can be a strong ally against the forces of destruction, whether they take the form of rogue nations or ethnic hatreds or terrorists trafficking in nuclear materials. And it could be a force for stability on a continent long wracked by division.

The situation in Russia today does pose some very real concerns. Senior officials who stood for reform have been fired. Protectionist pressures have jolted our trade. We continue to differ with Russia over its nuclear cooperation with Iran. And just last month, the Communist-dominated Duma voted for reconstituting the Soviet Union.

Let me emphasize here: We support the millions of former Soviet citizens in all those nations who broke the chains of tyranny in 1991. They have chosen freedom, and their will must be respected. President Yeltsin believes that and so do the vast majority of the Russian people.

There is also the tragedy of Chechnya, a tragedy for the Chechens, for the Russians and for all friends of Russian democracy. We support the territorial integrity of Russia, and we oppose attempts to change international borders through the use of force.

We oppose terrorism in all its forms. But we also oppose strongly the means the Russians have been using. Widespread and indiscriminate use of force has spilled far too much innocent blood and eroded support for Russia. The cycle of violence must end.

We welcome President Yeltsin's decision announced yesterday to begin withdrawing army units and to intensify the search for a settlement there. We call on the Chechens to respond in a similar spirit.

Just before I came over here, I got a report of a new attack on a Russian army column, and heavy losses resulted. We hope very much that this was the last shot in the last phase, rather than the opening shot in a new round of fighting.

So, we mustn't let our vision of Russia's future blur our view of its current problems. It doesn't serve us or the Russian people to pretend that real challenges don't exist or don't matter, but neither should we yield to the prophets of pessimism who insist that

Russia is doomed to repeat its past. If we shrug our shoulders, if we turn our backs, we risk creating a self-fulfilling prophecy, and we will miss a unique opportunity before us.

We always expected Russia's journey to reform to be uneven and difficult. We do not know, and indeed, we cannot know, what the outcome of that search will be. That is precisely why our strategy is designed for the long-haul. Only by staying engaged, steadily, patiently, intensively, can we help Russia seize the promise of a democratic future instead of reverting to its past. Only by keeping our eyes on the horizon, steering by the stars of our interests and our ideals, can we move toward the goal that will benefit our people, a stable, democratic, market-oriented Russia, secure within its borders and at peace with itself and with its neighbors.

Since taking office, President Clinton has worked closely with the Congress and our friends around the world to strengthen support for Russia's progress. And these efforts have paid real dividends, for America, for Russia and for the whole world.

So let's step back for a moment from the immediate problems that we can see all too clearly and try to understand the historic nature of the gains that have been made in the past few years. Over the last three years, our assistance has helped Russia to lay democracy's foundations: Political parties, free elections and an increasingly independent media. The Russian people now have a voice in governing their country. And the whole world will hear them express their views when they go to the polls in mid-June.

We have also seen major changes in Russia's economy. It wasn't long ago that the state's heavy hand gripped every enterprise and guided every decision. This was not the Invisible Hand.

Resources were wasted while basic needs went unmet. Long lines of shoppers stood in the cold for products that never arrived in the stores. Private property was an alien concept. The state managed everything, and it managed them badly.

The legacy of that period is still visible. But today, with America's strong support, more than 20,000 large enterprises and 100,000 small ones have been transferred to private hands. Now the private sector produces more than 60 percent of Russia's GDP. Inflation, as Gene Lawson said, has dropped from about 18 percent a month one year ago to around 3 percent today. Average monthly wages have grown.

All of this is good, of course, for the Russian people, and behind these statistics are the lives of the Russian people who are benefiting from reform, but it's also good, as you well know, for America as well. You know better than anyone that an open, stable, prosperous Russia will expand the frontiers of American business, creating jobs and opportunities back home here.

Many of you may be wondering — I'm sure you're wondering — what impact the June elections will have on Russia's commitment to continue its reforms. I won't speculate on the outcome of the elections, but there is one central fact. And that is any Russian government will face the same opportunity. And that is that Russia is pointed toward economic recovery if it stays the course of reform. Attempting to halt or reverse the process would impose a huge cost not just in resulting capital flight, inflation and shortages, but in the public support and confidence on which elected leaders depend. Sooner or later — and in democracies it's usually sooner — political leaders act on interest. And it is deeply in the interest of Russia and its leaders to stick with economic reform.

Most nations also act on interest in their foreign affairs. And, today, I believe that most Russians know that the best way to build security and prosperity at home is to press for integration with the rest of the world and not to isolate themselves behind walls of their own making.

With our backing, Russia has deepened its engagement with regional and global institutions. It has stepped up its responsibilities on the international stage from co-sponsoring the Middle East peace process to helping form the Contact Group on Bosnia. The Russian government has acted to improve relations with Russia's closest neighbors — from withdrawing Russian troops in the Baltics to resolving key differences with Ukraine. It's got a ways to go, but it has been making progress.

Russia also has begun to build bridges of security across the Cold War dividing lines of Europe. This is in Russia's interest — profoundly so —and in ours as well. Twice in this century, instability in Central Europe led to violent, global conflict that cost American and Russian lives —millions and millions of them. The best way to prevent that ever from happening again is to build an undivided Europe and to build it together.

For our part, we are working closely with our allies to create an integrated, secure Europe where Russia can play an important role. Our strategy is paying off. Russia is now a full member of the Partnership for Peace. The NATO-Russia relationship is expanding. And after 50 years of hostile confrontation, today, Russian and American troops are exercising together on land and at sea, working together at NATO headquarters and standing together to safeguard the peace in Bosnia.

The process of NATO enlargement is moving forward, and it will happen as new members are ready to add to NATO's strength and as the allies reach consensus. It will keep to its open, inclusive course and hold to its steady pace. Getting off-track in either direction would damage our long-term goal of enlargement. Delaying enlargement would destroy the momentum that we have built and the spirit that the new democracies have worked so hard to reform in preparation for membership. Calls to move more quickly could only challenge the consensus that we've developed in NATO and risk setting back — rather than accelerating — the process that the United States has done so much to create.

As we have stressed to our Russian colleagues, NATO enlargement is not directed at anyone. And the process will neither determine nor depend on events in Russia. NATO can do for Europe's East what it did 50 years ago for Europe's West. Prevent a return to local rivalries, strengthen democracy against future threats and provide the conditions in which fragile market economies can flourish. And as enlargement proceeds, we hope the NATO-Russian relationship will become a full-fledged partnership — an alliance with the alliance to tackle common problems together.

Nowhere will America's partnership with Russia do more to strengthen our mutual security, and nowhere has it been more effective than in reducing the nuclear threat.

Today, because of our steady engagement, America's cities and America's families are no longer targeted by Russian missiles. Kazakstan has given up the nuclear weapons left on its soil, and Ukraine and Belarus are removing theirs as well. Together, START I and START II, which we hope the Duma will soon ratify, will slash by two-thirds the nuclear arsenals that we in the former Soviet Union held at the height of the Cold War.

We want to build on this record of progress by enhancing the security of nuclear materials and by improving our ability to fight nuclear smuggling. These are among the issues that will top the agenda when President Clinton goes to Moscow later this month to help lead the Summit on Nuclear Safety and Security.

So the distance that Russia has traveled toward deepening democratic and market reform, conducting a measured foreign policy, and reducing the nuclear threat makes Russia's reversing course extremely difficult at best. It's not impossible, perhaps, but it would be hard for them to do and not at all in their interest.

That said, everyone here knows that the current economic and political situation in Russia is far from perfect. Trying to do business in Russia can be very trying indeed. The Red Army may be gone, but the red tape lingers on. Commercial success still depends too much on who you know and what favors you can get.

I want all of you to know that the hardship you confront in doing business in Russia is our business in the government as well, because ultimately it is the private sector that will lead Russia into the global economy and promote prosperity for both of our peoples.

You, here, were among the first on the ground — pioneers for American enterprise and ambassadors for American know-how. You make the investments and forge the relationships that will pay off down the line. And you recognize, as do we in government, that it makes good sense to hang in there today, because what millions of Russians are so determined to build will yield enormous dividends tomorrow.

We know that for Russia's economy to work, and for you to have the confidence you need to invest, the business climate has to be predictable and open. Contracts must be honored. The banking system must be strengthened. Taxes and their enforcement must be fair. Laws and regulations must be observed throughout the lands, and corruption must be rooted out.

Only the people of Russia can overcome these enormous challenges. Our interest — the American interest — is to help them succeed. It would be easy to resort to knee-jerk reactions whenever we disagree with Russia's politics or its policies. It would be easy to walk away. But we have worked too hard and accomplished too much. And it would be foolish and irresponsible to back out now. We have a responsibility

to future generations to lock in our gains and to build on them.

First, we must and will stand firm behind Russia's new democratic institutions — an independent judiciary, free media, accountable government. Strengthening democracy is also crucial for Russia's marketplace. For the rule of law that protects human rights will also help guarantee that contracts are respected, just as the searchlight of a free press can help expose corruption.

Second, we must continue our support for reform through international financial institutions such as the IMF. The new extended fund facility will help Russia keeps its economy on track. It sets tough performance requirements, monitors them monthly, and if performance falters, the money stops. The agreement is based on good policy and performance, not parties or personalities.

Third, we will continue to work with Russia on structural reforms and good business practices. This is a top priority with the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission. And, as long as the Russians work constructively with us, we will help them establish a tax code that is fair, a capital market that functions, and a legal framework that business needs to do business.

Together, these steps will help Russia create the economic security that its people so deeply desire. And finally, we will continue our efforts to reduce the nuclear threat and to advance common foreign policy interests. Our partnership with Russia can help shape the world we seek, where our interests are more likely to be protected and where our ideals of democracy and open markets can flourish.

I don't need to tell all of you in this room that the next few months will be vitally important ones for Russia. The eyes of the world will be watching as the Russian campaign gathers steam. The United States does not support any one candidate or party. We are, however, unequivocal in our support for reform and reformers. And all friends of Russian democracy want to see that the elections are free, fair and regular.

The Russian people face a critical choice now about the destiny of their nation, whether they will go into the new future that the reformers have laid out, or revert to the terrible past of Soviet communism. The greater Russia's commitment to political and market reform, the more effective America's support and that of the world will be.

We have worked hard to open the door to a stronger partnership with the West, to global markets, to international institutions, to a more peaceful and stable world. But only Russia can make the decision to cross that threshold for good. Only Russia can take responsibility for not closing that door on itself.

The Russian people want the same basic things that we do, security, prosperity and the chance to pass on to their children bolder opportunities, brighter hopes and a safer, better world. They have it within their power to make those dreams come true. But in the end, it is up to the Russians. We expect Russia to stay on the road of reform. And as it does America will keep its commitment to be with them every step of the way.

## Suggested Reading


Blum, Douglas W., editor. *Russia's Future : Consolidation or Disintegration?* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1994). 173 pages.

Brzezinski, Zbigniew. "The Premature Partnership: America and Russia" *Foreign Affairs* (March/April 1994, vol. 73, no. 2), pages 67-82.

Diller, Daniel C. *Russia and the Independent States* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1993). 481 pages.

Dunlop, John B. *The Rise of Russia and the Fall of the Soviet Union* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993). 360 pages.

Gardner, Hall. *Surviving the Millennium: American Global Strategy, the Collapse of the Soviet Empire, and the Question of Peace* (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1994). 261 pages.

Lapidus, Gail W., ed. *The New Russia: Troubled Transformation* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1995). 280 pages.

McDaniel, Tim. *The Agony of the Russian Idea* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1996). 201 pages.

Ragsdale, Hugh, ed. *Imperial Russian Foreign Policy* (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1993). 457 pages.

Randolph, Eleanor. *Waking the Tempests: Ordinary Life in the New Russia* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996). 431 pages.

Sestanovich, Stephen, ed. *Rethinking Russia's National Interests* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1994). 115 pages.

Steele, Jonathan. *Eternal Russia: Yeltsin, Gorbachev, and the Mirage of Democracy* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1994). 427 pages.

Yergin, Daniel and Gustafson, Thane. *Russia in 2010 and What It Means for the World* (New York: Random House, 1993). 300 pages.

Young, Stephen W., Bee, Ron J. and Seymore II, Bruce. *One Nation Becomes Many: The Access Guide to the Former Soviet Union* (Washington, DC: ACCESS, 1992). 124 pages.


*Surviving Together*, a quarterly on cooperative efforts to support civil and sustainable societies in Eurasia, features a "spotlight" on an area of conflict in the FSU in each publication. For a list of back issues or information on subscriptions, contact: ISAR, 1601 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite 301, Washington, DC 20009; (202) 387-3034.

# Publications List

The Choices for the 21st Century Education Project develops curricula for high schools and colleges on current foreign policy issues and offers workshops, institutes, and in-service programs for high school teachers. Course materials place special emphasis on the importance of educating students in their participatory role as citizens. All units incorporate the work of academics and policymakers from a range of perspectives and are classroom tested prior to publication. A new unit is published every three months during the academic year, and all units are updated regularly. For current information on new titles and revisions, call the Choices Education Project at (401) 863-3155 or visit the project on the World Wide Web at *http://www.brown.edu/Research/Choices/*.

### *Current Choices*

- China on the World Stage: Weighing the U.S. Response (Revised Feb. 1996, 77 pages)
- Keeping the Peace in an Age of Conflict: Debating the U.S. Role (Revised Oct. 1995, 69 pages)
- U.S. Immigration Policy in an Unsettled World (Revised April 1996, 63 pages)
- U.S. Trade Policy: Competing in a Global Economy (Revised March 1996, 56 pages)
- Global Environmental Problems: Implications for U.S. Policy (Revised March 1996, 60 pages)
- Help, Handout, or Hindrance: U.S. Support for the Developing World (June 1995, 66 pages)
- Russia's Uncertain Transition: Challenges for U.S. Policy (Revised August 1996, 70 pages)
- Charting Russia's Future in the Post-Soviet Era (Revised Aug. 1996, 72 pages)
- Caught between Two Worlds: Mexico at the Crossroads (Sept. 1996, 62 pages)
- The Role of the United States in a Changing World (Revised Nov. 1995, 44 pages)

### *Decision Points in History*

- A More Perfect Union: Shaping American Government (August 1996, 138 pages)
- Crisis, Conscience, and Choices: Weimar Germany and the Rise of Hitler (Nov. 1994, 84 pages)
- Ending the War against Japan: Science, Morality, and the Atomic Bomb (July 1995, 102 pages)
- Coming to Terms with Power: U.S. Choices after World War II (Aug. 1994, second edition, 68 pages)
- In the Shadow of the Cold War: The Caribbean and Central America in U.S. Foreign Policy (Revised Sept. 1995, 111 pages)
- The Limits of Power: The United States in Vietnam (Nov. 1994, second edition, 119 pages)

## ORDER FORM

| **Please send me the following material:** | **Price** | **Quantity** | **Subtotal** |
|---|---|---|---|
| China on the World Stage: Weighing the U.S. Response | $12.00 | | |
| Keeping the Peace in an Age of Conflict: Debating the U.S. Role | $12.00 | | |
| U.S. Immigration Policy in an Unsettled World | $12.00 | | |
| U.S. Trade Policy: Competing in a Global Economy | $12.00 | | |
| Global Environmental Problems: Implications for U.S. Policy | $12.00 | | |
| Help, Handout, or Hindrance: U.S. Support for the Developing World | $12.00 | | |
| Russia's Uncertain Transition: Challenges for U.S. Policy | $12.00 | | |
| Charting Russia's Future in the Post-Soviet Era | $12.00 | | |
| Caught between Two Worlds: Mexico at the Crossroads | $12.00 | | |
| The Role of the United States in a Changing World | $12.00 | | |
| A More Perfect Union: Shaping American Government | $14.00 | | |
| Crisis, Conscience, and Choices: Weimar Germany and the Rise of Hitler | $12.00 | | |
| Ending the War against Japan: Science, Morality, and the Atomic Bomb | $12.00 | | |
| Coming to Terms with Power: U.S. Choices after World War II | $12.00 | | |
| In the Shadow of the Cold War: The Caribbean and Central America in U.S. Foreign Policy | $14.00 | | |
| The Limits of Power: The United States in Vietnam | $14.00 | | |

*A teacher's resource book is included free with each unit ordered at regular price.*
*Classroom sets of student texts (15 or more of the same unit) are available at $5 per copy.*

**Subtotal** _____ _____
*add 7% for shipping and handling* _____

TOTAL _____ _____

Make checks payable to: **Brown University**

Return to: Choices Education Project
Watson Institute for International Studies
Brown University, Box 1948
Providence, RI 02912

Name _____
School/Org _____
Street _____
City/State _____ Zip _____

Teacher's
Resource
Book

CHOICES FOR THE 21st CENTURY

# Russia's Uncertain Transition: Challenges For U.S. Policy

ALTERNATIVES FOR PUBLIC DEBATE
AND POLICY DEVELOPMENT

A program of the Thomas J. Watson Jr.
Institute for International Studies

Brown University, Box 1948, Providence, RI 02912

53

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

*Russia's Uncertain Transition: Challenges for U.S. Policy* was developed by the Choices for the 21st Century Education Project staff with the assistance of the research staff of the Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies, scholars at Brown University, and several other experts in the field. We wish to thank the following researchers for their invaluable input:

Deana Arsenian, *Assistant Director*
*Center for Foreign Policy Development, Watson Institute*

Mark Garrison, *Former Director*
*Center for Foreign Policy Development, Watson Institute*

P. Terrence Hopmann, *Director*
*Center for Foreign Policy Development, Watson Institute*

Sergei N. Khrushchev, *Senior Visiting Scholar*
*Center for Foreign Policy Development, Watson Institute*

Leonid Kistersky, *E. L. Wiegand Distinguished Visiting Professor*
*Center for Foreign Policy Development, Watson Institute*

Mark Kramer, *Research Associate*
*Center for Foreign Policy Development, Watson Institute*

Heidi Kroll, *Economist*
*United States Agency for International Development*

James R. Millar, *Director*
*The Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies*
*George Washington University*

Stephen Shenfield, *Research Associate*
*Center for Foreign Policy Development, Watson Institute*

Richard Smoke, *Research Director*
*Center for Foreign Policy Development, Watson Institute*

Michael Spagat, *Assistant Professor of Economics*
*Brown University*

To Mary Lhowe, editorial associate at the Watson Institute, we extend additional thanks for editing this unit. Special thanks also to the high school teachers who tested drafts of this material in their classrooms prior to publication: Don Bakker of North Eastham, Massachusetts; Steve Buenning of Palatine, Illinois; and Candace Fisk of Springfield, Missouri.

*Russia's Uncertain Transition: Challenges for U.S. Policy* is part of a continuing series on current foreign policy issues. A new unit is published every three months during the academic year. Finally, we wish to thank The Pew Charitable Trusts, for without their financial support the series would not have come to fruition.

**CHOICES**

***for the 21st Century Education Project***

***August 1996***

**Director**
Susan Graseck

**Curriculum Developer**
Mark Malkasian

**Director of School Programs**
Patricia Keenan-Byrne

**Coordinator of Library Program**
Megan Secatore

**Program Associate**
Lucy Mueller

**Staff Associate**
Anne Campau Prout

The Choices for the 21st Century Education Project develops curricula for high schools and colleges on current foreign policy issues and offers workshops, institutes, and in-service programs for high school teachers. Course materials place special emphasis on the importance of educating students in their participatory role as citizens.

The Choices for the 21st Century Education Project is a program of the **Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies** at Brown University.

Thomas J. Biersteker
*Director*

## Suggested Five-Day Lesson Plan


**About the Choices Approach** ii

**Note to Teachers** 1

**Integrating This Unit into Your Classroom** 2

**DAY ONE — Examining the Principles of U.S. Cold War Policy** 3

Homework (before Day One): Part I of the background reading and "Study Guide — Part I"
Homework: Part II of the background reading and "Study Guide — Part II"

**DAY TWO — Assessing the Reform Process in Russia** 6

Homework: Part III of the background reading and "Study Guide — Part III"

**DAY THREE — Role Playing the Four Options: Organization and Preparation** 9

Homework: "Expressing Key Values"

**DAY FOUR — Role Playing the Four Options: Debate and Discussion** 14

Homework: "Focusing Your Thoughts"

**DAY FIVE — Fleshing Out Policy** 16

**Alternative Three-Day Lesson Plan** 20

**Making Choices Work in Your Classroom** 21

The Choices for the 21st Century Education Project is a program of the Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies at Brown University. Choices was established to help citizens think constructively about foreign policy issues, to improve participatory citizenship skills, and to encourage public judgment on policy priorities.

The Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies was established at Brown University in 1986 to serve as a forum for students, faculty, visiting scholars, and policy practitioners, who are committed to studying global problems and developing international initiatives to benefit society.


© Copyright August 1994. Revised August 1996. Choices for the 21st Century Education Project. All rights reserved. Permission is granted to duplicate and distribute for classroom use with appropriate credit given. Copies may be ordered at $12.00 each. Address orders to: Choices Education Project, Watson Institute for International Studies, Box 1948, Brown University, Providence, RI 02912.

## About the Choices Approach

Choices for the 21st Century curricula are designed to make complex international issues understandable and meaningful for students. Using an innovative approach to student-centered instruction, Choices units develop critical thinking and civic judgment — essential ingredients of responsible citizenship.

**Understanding the Significance of History:** Each Choices unit provides students with a thorough introduction to the topic under consideration. Students gain an understanding of the historical background and the status of current issues. In this way, they see how history has shaped our world. With this foundation, students are prepared to thoughtfully consider a variety of perspectives on public policy.

**Exploring Policy Alternatives:** Each Choices unit is built around a framework of alternative policy options that challenges students to consider multiple perspectives and to think critically about the issue at hand. Students are best able to understand and analyze the options through a cooperative learning/role-play activity. In groups, students explore their assigned options and plan short presentations. The setting of the role-play may be a Congressional hearing, meeting of the National Security Council, or an election campaign forum. Student groups defend their policy options and, in turn, are challenged with questions from their classmates. The ensuing debate demands analysis and evaluation of the many conflicting values, interests, and priorities reflected in the options.

**Exercising Civic Judgment:** Armed with fresh insights from the role-play and debate, students are challenged to articulate original, coherent policy options that reflect their own values, priorities, and goals as individuals and citizens. Students' views can be expressed in letters to Congress or the White House, editorials for the school or community newspaper, persuasive speeches, or visual presentations.

**Why Use the Choices Approach?** Choices curricula are informed by current educational research about how students learn best. Studies have consistently demonstrated that students of all abilities learn best when they are actively engaged with the material rather than listening passively to a lecture. Student-centered instructional activities motivate students and develop higher-order thinking skills. However, some high school educators find the transition from lecture format to student-centered instruction difficult. Lecture is often viewed as the most efficient way to cover the required material. Choices curricula offer teachers a flexible resource for covering course material while actively engaging students and developing skills in critical thinking, persuasive writing, and informed citizenship. The instructional activities that are central to Choices units can be valuable components in any teacher's repertoire of effective teaching strategies. Each Choices unit includes student readings, a framework of policy options, suggested lesson plans, and resources for structuring cooperative learning, role-plays, and simulations. Students are challenged to:

- recognize relationships between history and current issues
- analyze and evaluate multiple perspectives on an issue
- understand the internal logic of a viewpoint
- engage in informed debate
- identify and weigh the conflicting values represented by different points of view
- reflect upon personal values and priorities surrounding an issue
- develop and articulate original viewpoints on an issue
- communicate in written and oral presentations
- collaborate with peers

Teachers who use Choices units say the collaboration and interaction that take place are highly motivating for students. Opportunities abound for students to contribute their individual talents to the group presentations in the form of political cartoons, slogans, posters, or characterizations. These cooperative learning lessons invite students to take pride in their own contributions and the group product, enhancing students' self-esteem and confidence as learners. Choices units offer students with diverse abilities and learning styles the opportunity to contribute, collaborate, and achieve.

## Note to Teachers

The end of the Cold War has nudged Russia closer to the West. Russian officials regularly sit down with their Western counterparts at international conferences, while Russian business executives are frequent visitors to New York, London, Los Angeles, and Berlin. Russian society has never been more open to the outside world.

At the same time, many of the most important developments in Russia remain cloaked by Kremlin intrigue or obscured by the complexity of Russia's political and cultural past. Viktor Chernomyrdin plots against Alexander Lebed. Lucrative industries fall into the hands of a shadowy underworld. Russian generals protest cuts in the military budget. Communists and nationalists blame their country's problems on U.S.-engineered conspiracies. And the saga continues. Few Americans have the time and the background to keep up with the pace of events in Russia. And yet, the country remains an area of vital concern for the United States.

*Russia's Uncertain Transition: Challenges for U.S. Policy* allows students and teachers to step back from the day-to-day turmoil in Russia to consider the issues that most deeply affect Americans. At the core of the unit are four distinct options for U.S. policy. Each option contains a different perspective on the threats and opportunities presented by conditions in Russia. By exploring a spectrum of alternatives, students gain a deeper understanding of the values and assumptions underlying U.S. foreign policy. The background reading provides students with the knowledge needed to take part in the debate on the U.S. role in Russia's transition. Part I offers a historical overview of U.S. relations with the Russian empire and the Soviet Union. Part II surveys the economic and political changes that Russia has undergone since the Soviet collapse, with special attention given to Russia's evolving foreign policy. Part III concentrates on the leading challenges facing U.S. policymakers with respect to Russia and its neighbors.

**Suggested Five-Day Lesson Plan:** The Teacher's Resource Book accompanying *Russia's Uncertain Transition: Challenges for U.S. Policy* contains a day-by-day lesson plan and student activities. The unit opens with students assessing the values and assumptions that framed U.S. policy at the onset of the Cold War. Next, students are asked to reflect on how people in today's Russia view the changes affecting their lives. The third and fourth days of the lesson plan involve students in a simulation in which they act as advocates of the four options or take on the role of members of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. On the fifth day, students develop coherent policy recommendations based on their own values and beliefs. You may also find the "Alternative Three-Day Lesson Plan" useful.

The lesson plan offered for *Russia's Uncertain Transition: Challenges for U.S. Policy* is a guide. Many teachers choose to devote additional time to certain activities. We hope that these suggestions help you in tailoring the unit to fit the needs of your classroom.

## Integrating This Unit into Your Curriculum

Units produced by the Choices for the 21st Century Education Project are designed to be integrated into a variety of social studies courses. Below are a few ideas about where *Russia's Uncertain Transition: Challenges for U.S. Policy* might fit into your curriculum.

**Nuclear Proliferation:** The disintegration of the Soviet Union has raised serious new questions about nuclear proliferation. The breakdown of the Soviet system has led to a weakening of the strict controls governing the Soviet nuclear program. Tons of nuclear material, much of it based in poorly guarded non-military facilities, have become vulnerable to nuclear smugglers. The dangers associated with the Soviet collapse come at a time when several Third World counties — particularly North Korea, Iran, and Iraq — are actively seeking to develop their own nuclear arsenals.

**China Policy:** As progress toward reform in Russia lurches and sputters, Americans are debating what influence, if any, our country can have on Russia's future course. The same questions have been asked with respect to China, both in recent years and during the late 1940s. Like Russia, China is a huge country that has undergone tremendous change since the 1980s. With China's growing economic power, Chinese foreign policy has become more important than ever for the United States. But while China's impact on the international arena has steadily expanded, U.S. leverage over China has remained limited. Should the United States be doing more to ensure friendly relations with China? Should our country have taken stronger action in the late 1940s to prevent the victory of communism in China? The study of U.S. policy toward Russia holds many lessons for students of our country's relationship with Beijing.

**Reflections on the Cold War:** As the United States gropes to develop a new relationship with its former Cold War enemy, many foreign policy specialists are drawing lessons from the post-World War II era. The strategy to contain the Soviet Union was formulated in a period of confusion and indecision. Part of the impetus came from the intellectual force of George Kennan and a few of his colleagues in the foreign policy establishment. International events — particularly the fall of Czechoslovakia's democratic government and the Berlin blockade — were also a decisive factor. With the Clinton administration struggling to give shape to current U.S. foreign policy, the time is ripe to reflect on the origins of our country's Cold War strategy and the institutions, such as NATO, that defined the U.S. role in the world for four decades.

**Foreign Aid:** Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia and its neighbors have absorbed a substantial share of the U.S. foreign aid budget. At the same time, U.S. foreign aid spending has shrunk in much of the developing world. The shift in priorities that has occurred in recent years gives Americans an opportunity to reassess our country's overall approach to foreign aid. Evaluating the results of the Marshall Plan is a good place to start. Teachers might also consider examining the record of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. In addition, a unit on foreign aid could also explore the expectations and concerns of recipient countries.

# Examining the Principles of U.S. Cold War Policy

**Objectives:**

*Students will:*

- Identify the assumptions and beliefs that formed the basis of George Kennan's views toward the Soviet Union.
- Analyze Kennan's thesis in the context of U.S. relations with Russia and the Soviet Union before World War II.
- Evaluate how Kennan's recommendations influenced U.S. policy during the course of the Cold War.

**Required Reading:**

Before beginning the unit, students should have read Part I of the background reading and completed "Study Guide — Part I."

**Handouts:**

- "Sources of Soviet Conduct" (page 5).

**In the Classroom:**

*1. Getting Started* — Distribute "Sources of Soviet Conduct" and call on students to quickly read it. Note that, in Kennan's view, communist ideology — not the Russian national character — was the driving force behind the Soviet Union's hostility toward the West.

*2. Analyzing Kennan's Thesis* — Direct student attention to the first underlined passage. Why did Kennan believe that "the aims of the capitalist world are antagonistic to the Soviet regime"? What factors had undermined the friendly relations between the United States and Russia in the 19th century and the U.S.-Soviet wartime alliance?

Note that in the second underlined passage, Kennan refers to "unceasing constant pressure" against the West as a cornerstone of Soviet foreign policy. Ask students to identify historical examples from the background reading that validate Kennan's thesis. In what ways did Soviet foreign policy change from the publication of Kennan's article to Gorbachev's "new thinking"? Which elements of Soviet foreign policy were driven by communist ideology? Which were motivated by traditional Russian national interests?

Explain that the third underlined passage encapsulates the U.S. policy of containment carried out during the Cold War. Ask students to assess the success of U.S. Cold War policy. To what degree did the containment strategy contribute to the end of the Cold War? What were the alternatives? As students read Part II of the background reading, they should be thinking about how the Russian role in the world has changed as a result of the Soviet collapse.

**Homework:**

Students should read Part II of the background reading and complete "Study Guide — Part II."

Name:

# Study Guide — Part I
## Two Centuries of U.S.-Russian Relations

1. Which international interests were shared in common by the United States and Russia in the 19th century?

2. Why was the communist system created by Lenin and Stalin seen as a rejection of Western capitalism?

3. What assumptions and beliefs about the Soviet Union led U.S. leaders to launch the Marshall Plan and establish NATO?

4. How did international events in the late 1940s and early 1950s contribute to a deepening of Cold War hostility?

5. What were the main reasons Nixon initiated the policy of detente toward the Soviet Union?

6. How did Gorbachev's reform policies contribute to the collapse of the Soviet Union?

# The Sources of Soviet Conduct
## by "X"

*Below are excerpts from an article authored by U.S. diplomat George F. Kennan. The article appeared in* Foreign Affairs *in July 1947 and came to serve as the cornerstone for U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union during the Cold War. (The Supplementary Documents section of your text contains Kennan's article in its entirety.)*

...there can never be on Moscow's side any sincere assumption of a community of aims between the Soviet Union and powers which are regarded as capitalist. It must invariably be assumed in Moscow that the aims of the capitalist world are antagonistic to the Soviet regime, and therefore to the interests of the peoples it controls. If the Soviet Government occasionally sets its signature to documents which would indicate the contrary, this is to be regarded as a tactical manoeuvre permissible in dealing with the enemy (who is without honor) and should be taken in the spirit of *caveat emptor*. Basically, the antagonism remains. It is postulated. And from it flow many of the phenomena which we find disturbing in the Kremlin's conduct of foreign policy: the secretiveness, the lack of frankness, the duplicity, the wary suspiciousness, and the basic unfriendliness of purpose...

...we have seen that the Kremlin is under no ideological compulsion to accomplish its purposes in a hurry. Like the Church, it is dealing in ideological concepts which are of long-term validity, and it can afford to be patient. It has no right to risk the existing achievements of the revolution for the sake of vain baubles of the future. The very teachings of Lenin himself require great caution and flexibility in the pursuit of Communist purposes. Again, these precepts are fortified by the lessons of Russian history: of centuries of obscure battles between nomadic forces over the stretches of a vast unfortified plain. Here caution, circumspection, flexibility, and deception are the valuable qualities; and their value finds natural appreciation in the Russian or the oriental mind. Thus the Kremlin has no compunction about retreating in the face of a superior force. And being under the compulsion of no timetable, it does not get panicky under the necessity for such retreat. Its political action is a fluid stream which moves constantly, wherever it is permitted to move, toward a given goal. Its main concern is to make sure that it has filled every nook and cranny available to it in the basin of world power. But if it finds unassailable barriers in its path, it accepts these philosophically and accommodates itself to them. The main thing is that there should always be pressure, unceasing constant pressure, toward the desired goal. There is no trace of any feeling in Soviet psychology that that goal must be reached at any given time.

These considerations make Soviet diplomacy at once easier and more difficult to deal with than the diplomacy of individual aggressive leaders like Napoleon and Hitler. On the one hand it is more sensitive to contrary force, more ready to yield on individual sectors of the diplomatic front when that force is felt to be too strong, and thus more rational in the logic and rhetoric of power. On the other hand it cannot be easily defeated or discouraged by a single victory on the part of its opponents. And the patient persistence by which it is animated means that it can be effectively countered not by sporadic acts which represent the momentary whims of democratic opinion but only by intelligent long-range policies on the part of Russia's adversaries — policies no less steady in their purpose, and no less variegated and resourceful in their application, than those of the Soviet Union itself.

In these circumstances it is clear that the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies.

## Assessing the Reform Process in Russia

**Objectives:**

*Students will:*

- Consider the consequences of Russia's transition from a Russian perspective.
- Analyze the impact of change in Russia on the shape of the country's political spectrum.
- Articulate Russian viewpoints in a collaborative role-play setting.

**Required Reading:**

Students should have read Part II of the background reading and completed "Study Guide — Part II."

**Handouts:**

- "Exploring Russian Attitudes" (page 8).

**In the Classroom:**

*1. Russian Groups* — Form five groups of two to four students. (In order to save time in the classroom, form student groups before beginning Day Two.) Distribute "Exploring Russian Attitudes" and assign each of the groups a role from the handout. Instruct the Russian groups to read about their assigned roles. They should also review Part II of the background reading to identify issues that are relevant to their assigned characters.

*2. American Journalists* — The remainder of the class will represent American journalists. Inform members of this group that they are touring Russia to gather information for articles on Russia's transition. They should develop questions that would be appropriate for ordinary Russians. Emphasize that the questions should be general in nature, so that each group will be able to respond. For example, suggest that the journalists ask each group to evaluate the dismantling of the Soviet economic system. How have the changes affected the lives of the individuals represented?

*3. Managing the Role Play* — After students have completed their preparations, call on the journalists to direct their questions to the Russian groups. Remind the Russian groups that their responses should reflect the perspectives of their assigned roles.

*4. Guiding Discussion* — At the conclusion of the role play, ask students to compare the positions of the Russian groups. What factors account for the different viewpoints? Which values stood out most prominently? How do students assess the prospects for continued reform in Russia?

**Homework:**

Students should read Part III of the background reading and complete "Study Guide — Part III."

Name: Day 2

## Study Guide — Part II
### Keeping Up with a Changing Russia

1. How do the political views of the communists and nationalists in Russia differ from those of the Yeltsin government?

2. What accounts for the setbacks of the Russian army in Chechnya? How has the war affected the outlook of Russians?

3. Why did the "shock therapy" program of economic reform encounter strong resistance?

4. How has Russia's economy changed since the Soviet collapse? How have these changes affected Russia's position in the international arena?

5. Why are Ukraine and Kazakstan at the top of Russia's foreign policy agenda?

6. How has the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) helped serve Russia's foreign policy goals in the near abroad?

## Exploring Russian Attitudes

*Instructions:* Your group has been called upon to express the concerns of ordinary Russians. Your teacher will assign you one of the roles below. You will be questioned by several American journalists about the changes that have taken place in Russia since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Your responses should reflect the perspective of your assigned role. To gain a firm understanding of the role you are representing, review Part II of the background reading and share your ideas with the other members in your group.

***1. Computer Software Designer***

You graduated from one of the Soviet Union's leading institutes in computer science in 1990. Although you have come to recognize that your training was not equal to that of your colleagues in the West, you have benefited in recent years from the growing exchange of information between Russia and the outside world. Along with several other recent graduates, you have formed a successful software development company. By charging fees five times below the standards of the West, you have attracted many clients from the United States and Western Europe.

***2. Unemployed Steel Worker***

You have worked in a huge steel factory for nearly thirty years. During the Soviet era, your enterprise supplied steel for defense factories, but orders began to go down in 1990. In 1994, your enterprise shifted from state control to private ownership. Although you and your co-workers were given shares in the company, the factory managers claimed that they could no longer afford to keep everyone employed. Many of your friends were laid off. You remain on the factory payroll, but inflation has eaten away at your income. Your monthly salary is worth only about $35 a month. Moreover, your shares in the company are practically worthless. Your factory's managers contend that they need government help to invest in new technology to revive Russia's steel industry.

***3. Naval Officer***

You serve on a Russian ship based in the Black Sea. After the Soviet Union fell apart, Ukrainian officials called on you to pledge your loyalty to Ukraine. You refused, but a few of your fellow officers signed the pledge. There have even been a few scuffles between Russian and Ukrainian sailors in the port of Sevastopol. While the Soviet Union was intact, there was hardly any thought as to who was Russian and who was Ukrainian. Meanwhile, the maintenance of your ship has suffered because of budget cutbacks. Military salaries are so low that many of your fellow officers are leaving the navy.

***4. Small Business Owner***

You have started a business from scratch selling snack foods to the public. After the fall of the Soviet Union, you began importing dried fruit and pistachios from Iran. You also began buying sunflower and pumpkin seeds from southern Russia. Your business now has eight employees who sell your products from small sidewalk booths. A good share of your profits goes to the local mafia, but so far they have protected you from thieves. You also have to regularly bribe government officials to get the licenses you need to operate. Although you worked as an engineer for more than a decade, you're earning much more money now as a businessman.

***5. Refugee from Chechnya***

You are among the tens of thousands of Russians who have fled the war in Chechnya. You had a comfortable life in Grozny, the Chechen capital, during the Soviet era. You and your family had moved there in the 1960s when you were still young. After college, you worked as a petrochemical engineer at a local oil refinery. Although you are ethnically Russian, many of your close friends are Chechen. When the war began in December 1994, you and your family were forced to live in the basement of your apartment building for days at a time. You fled during a lull in the Russian army's attack. Now you are unemployed and living with relatives in an overcrowded apartment in southern Russia. If conditions in Chechnya return to normal, you would like to go back to your old home.

## Role Playing the Four Options: Organization and Preparation

***Objectives:***

*Students will:*

- Analyze the issues that frame the debate on U.S. policy toward Russia.
- Identify the core underlying values of the options.
- Integrate the arguments and beliefs of the options and the background reading into a persuasive, coherent presentation.
- Work cooperatively within groups to organize effective presentations.

***Required Reading:***

Students should have read Part III of the background reading and completed "Study Guide — Part III."

***Handouts:***

- "Presenting Your Option" (page 11) for option groups.
- "Expressing Key Values" (page 12) for option groups.
- "Committee on Foreign Relations of the U.S. Senate" (page 13) for committee members.

***In the Classroom:***

*1. Setting the Stage* — In order to save time in the classroom, form student groups before beginning Day Three. During the class period of Day Three, students will be preparing for the Day Four simulation. Remind them to incorporate the background reading into the development of their presentations and questions.

*2a. Option Groups* — Form four groups of four students. Assign an option to each group. Distribute "Presenting Your Option" to the four option groups. Inform students that each option group will be called upon in Day Four to present the case for its assigned option to members of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the U.S. Senate. Explain that option groups should follow the instructions in "Presenting Your Option." Note that the option groups should begin by assigning each member a role.

*2b. Committee Members* — The remainder of the class will serve as members of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the U.S. Senate. Distribute "Committee on Foreign Relations of the U.S. Senate" to each committee member. While the option groups are preparing their presentations, members of the Committee on Foreign Relations should develop cross-examination questions for Day Four. (See "Committee on Foreign Relations of the U.S. Senate.") Remind committee members that they are expected to turn in their questions at the end of the simulation.

***Suggestions:***

In smaller classes, other teachers or administrators may be invited to serve as members of the committee. In larger classes, additional roles — such as those of newspaper reporter or lobbyist — may be assigned to students.

***Extra Challenge:***

Ask the option groups to design a campaign poster illustrating the best case for their options.

***Homework:***

Students should complete preparations for the simulation.

Name:

## Study Guide — Part III
### Challenges Facing the United States

1. Why has the collapse of the Soviet Union created a new set of dangers associated with nuclear weapons?

2. Why has Russia been reluctant to press forward with cutting its nuclear weapons arsenal?

3. Explain how American and Russian positions toward NATO differ.

   *American position:*

   *Russian position:*

4. In what areas of the "near abroad" have U.S. and Russian interests come into conflict? Explain the causes of the friction.

5. How has U.S. policy on economic assistance to Russia shifted since 1992?

6. How could U.S. trade policy be changed to help the Russian economy?

# Presenting Your Option

## *Preparing Your Presentation*

Your Assignment: Your group has been called upon to appear before the Committee on Foreign Relations of the U.S. Senate. Your assignment is to persuade the committee members that your option should be the basis for U.S. policy toward Russia. You will be judged on how well you present your option.

Organizing Your Group: Each member of your group will take a specific role. Below is a brief explanation of the responsibilities for each role.

1. *Spokesperson:* Your job is to explain the option of your group to the Committee on Foreign Relations in a three-to-five minute presentation. In preparing your presentation, you will receive help from the other members of your group. You should include arguments from their areas of expertise. Keep in mind, though, that you are expected to take the lead in organizing your group. Read your option and review the background reading to build a strong case for your option. The "Expressing Key Values" worksheet will help you organize your thoughts.

2. *Russian Expert:* Your job is to advise the spokesperson of your group as to how current developments in Russia justify the position of your option. Carefully read your option, and then review Part II of the background reading. Make sure that your area of expertise is reflected in the presentation of your group spokesperson. The "Expressing Key Values" worksheet will help you organize your thoughts.

3. *U.S. Foreign Policy Adviser:* Your job is to advise the spokesperson of your group on why your option best addresses the foreign policy challenges facing the United States. Carefully read your option, and then review Part III of the background reading. Make sure that your area of expertise is reflected in the presentation of your group spokesperson. The "Expressing Key Values" worksheet will help you organize your thoughts.

4. *Historian:* Your job is to advise the spokesperson of your group on how the lessons of history justify the position of your option. Carefully read your option, paying close attention to the "Lessons of the Cold War" section, and then review Part I of the background reading. Make sure that your area of expertise is reflected in the presentation of your group spokesperson. The "Expressing Key Values" worksheet will help you organize your thoughts.

## *Making Your Case*

After your preparations are completed, your spokesperson will deliver a three-to-five minute presentation to the Committee on Foreign Relations. The "Expressing Key Values" worksheet and other notes may be used, but the spokesperson should speak clearly and convincingly. During the presentations, you should try to identify the weak points of the other options. After all of the groups have presented their options, members of the Senate committee will ask you cross-examination questions. Any member of your group may respond during the cross-examination period.

Name:

## Expressing Key Values

The notion of values lies at the core of this unit. Each of the four options in this unit revolves around a distinct set of values. The opening two paragraphs of your option are devoted to making a convincing case for the values that are represented. The term "values," however, is not easy to define. Most often, we think of values in connection with our personal lives. Our attitudes toward our families, friends, and communities are a reflection of our personal values.

Values play a critical role in our civic life as well. In the United States, our country's political system and foreign policy have been shaped by a wide range of values. The high value many Americans place on freedom, democracy, and individual liberty rings loudly throughout U.S. history. For most of our country's existence, the impulse to spread American values beyond our borders was outweighed by the desire to remain independent of foreign entanglements. Since World War II, however, the United States has played a larger role in world affairs than any other nation. At times, American leaders have emphasized the values of human rights and cooperation. On other occasions, the values of stability and security have been stressed.

Some values fit together well. Others are in conflict. Americans are constantly being forced to choose among competing values in our ongoing debate about foreign policy. Your job is to identify and explain the most important values underlying your option. These values should be clearly expressed by every member of your group. This worksheet will help you organize your thoughts.

1. What are the two most important values underlying your option?

   a.

   b.

2. According to the values of your option, what should be the role of the United States in the world?

3. Why should the values of your option be the guiding force for U.S. policy toward Russia?

# Committee on Foreign Relations of the U.S. Senate
## Hearing on U.S. Policy toward Russia

### *Your Role*

As a member of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the U.S. Senate, you consider issues relating to our country's foreign policy. As you know, the Soviet Union was the focus of U.S. foreign policy for over four decades after World War II. Now that the Soviet Union has collapsed, Americans are debating what role, if any, the United States should play in the transition taking place in Russia. These hearings will introduce you to four distinct approaches to this question.

### *Your Assignment*

While the four option groups are organizing their presentations, you should prepare two questions regarding each of the options. Your teacher will collect these questions at the end of Day Four.

Your questions should be challenging and critical. For example, a good question for Option 1 might be:

> *Isn't there a danger that strong U.S. support for economic reform in Russia will lead Russians to blame our country for the suffering associated with change?*

On Day Four, the four option groups will present their positions. After their presentations are completed, your teacher will call on you and your fellow committee members to ask questions. The "Evaluation Form" you received is designed for you to record your impressions of the option groups. Part I should be filled out in class after the option groups make their presentations. Part II should be completed as homework. After this activity is concluded, you may be called upon to explain your evaluation of the option groups.

## Role Playing the Four Options: Debate and Discussion

***Objectives:***

*Students will:*

- Articulate the leading values influencing U.S. policy toward Russia.
- Explore, debate, and evaluate multiple perspectives on U.S. foreign policy.
- Sharpen rhetorical skills through debate and discussion.
- Cooperate with classmates in staging a persuasive presentation.

***Handouts:***

- "Evaluation Form" (page 15) for the committee members.

***In the Classroom:***

*1. Setting the Stage* — Organize the room so that the four option groups face a row of desks reserved for the Committee on Foreign Relations. Distribute "Evaluation Form" to the committee members. Instruct members of the committee to fill out the first part of their "Evaluation Form" during the course of the period. The second part of the worksheet should be completed as homework.

*2. Managing the Simulation* — Explain that the simulation will begin with three-to-five minute presentations by the spokespersons for the option groups. Encourage the spokespersons to speak clearly and convincingly.

*3. Guiding Discussion* — Following the presentations, invite members of the Committee on Foreign Relations to ask cross-examination questions. Make sure that each committee member has an opportunity to ask at least one question. The questions should be evenly distributed among all four option groups. If time permits, encourage members of the option groups to challenge the positions of the other groups. During cross-examination, allow any option group member to respond. (As an alternative approach, permit cross-examination following the presentation of each option; allow any option group member to respond. (As an alternative approach, permit cross-

***Homework:***

Students should read each of the four options, then moving beyond these options they should fill out "Focusing Your Thoughts" and complete "Your Option Five."

***Homework:***

Students should read each of the four options, then moving beyond these options they should fill out "Focusing Your Thoughts" and complete "Your Option Five."

## Evaluation Form
### Committee on Foreign Relations of the U.S. Senate

***Part I***

| What was the most persuasive argument presented in favor of this option? | What was the most persuasive argument presented against this option? |
|---|---|
| *Option 1* | *Option 1* |
| *Option 2* | *Option 2* |
| *Option 3* | *Option 3* |
| *Option 4* | *Option 4* |

***Part II***

Which group presented its option most effectively? Explain your answer.

***Part II***

Which group presented its option most effectively? Explain your answer.

# Fleshing Out Policy

***Objectives:***

*Students will:*

- Articulate coherent recommendations for U.S. policy toward Russia based on personally held values and historical understanding.
- Compare their policy guidelines with the position of the Clinton administration.
- Analyze the goals and values underlying policy recommendations.

***Required Reading:***

Students should have read the four options and completed "Focusing Your Thoughts" and "Your Option Five."

***Handouts:***

- "Comparing Your Recommendations" (page 19).

***In the Classroom:***

*1. Analyzing Beliefs* — Call on members of the Senate committee to share their evaluations of the option groups. Which arguments were most convincing? Which beliefs were most appealing? What were the main threats addressed by each of the options?

*2. Student Options* — Call on students to summarize their answers to "Your Option Five." What were the chief concerns that guided the formulation of their options? What are their views about the future of U.S. relations with Russia? In what direction do they believe Russia is headed over the next decade? How important is this part of the world compared to other issues at home and abroad?

*3. Drawing Comparisons* — Distribute "Comparing Your Recommendations" and review the handout with the class. Which interests and goals dominate the Clinton administration's policy toward Russia? What values stand out most clearly? Do the policy steps reflect the values? Ask students to compare their own recommendations with the position of the Clinton administration. What are the main areas of disagreement? What accounts for the differences? Which statements in the handout enjoy widespread support among the students? What are the main areas of disagreement? What accounts for the difference? Which statements in the handout enjoy widespread support among the students?

***Extra Challenge:***

Have students work in teams to write a letter to Congress or President Clinton on their ideas for U.S. policy toward Russia. In the first part of the letter, students should present the values and assumptions underlying their viewpoint, while in the second part of the letter students should present a coherent set of policy recommendations.

***Extra Challenge:***

Encourage students to explore the local dimension of the debate on U.S. foreign policy. For example, students could be asked to contact organizations that have a deeply rooted interest in U.S. policy toward Russia. Groups that have sought to promote U.S. trade with Russia and its neighbors, such as oil companies and farm bureaus, have voiced their views on this issue. Ethnic organizations, and friendship societies are also active in the foreign policy arena. In addition, recent years have witnessed an influx of immigrants, scholars, , and students from Russia.

# Focusing Your Thoughts

*Instructions:* You have had an opportunity to consider four options on U.S. policy toward Russia. Now it is your turn to look at each of the options from your own perspective. Try each one on for size. Think about how the options address your concerns and hopes. You will find that each has its own risks and trade-offs, advantages and disadvantages. After you complete this worksheet, you will be asked to develop your own option on this issue.

### *Ranking the Options*

Which of the options below do you prefer? Rank the options, with "1" being the best option for the United States to follow.

___ **Option 1: Guide Russia Forward**

___ **Option 2: Keep the Lid On**

___ **Option 3: Declaw the Russian Bear**

___ **Option 4: Mind Our Own Business**

### *Beliefs*

Considering the statements below will help you answer the first three questions of "Your Option Five." Rate each of them according to your personal beliefs:

1 = Strongly Support 3 = Oppose 5 = Undecided
2 = Support 4 = Strongly Oppose

___ The greatest threats facing the United States are all at home: budget deficits, mediocre schools, crime, and an inadequate health care system.

___ Our most trustworthy allies are those countries that share our democratic principles and free-market economic system.

___ Geography and culture largely determine which countries are enemies of the United States.

___ Trying to make deep changes in other societies is naive and dangerous.

___ The main foreign policy interests of the United States lie in preserving stability and order around the world.

___ We will always have to compete with other nations for power.

___ Every country, even one emerging from communism, is capable of transforming itself into a free-market democracy.

___ The end of the Cold War has made the world a more dangerous place.

### *Creating Your Own Option*

Your next assignment is to create an option that reflects your own beliefs and opinions. You may borrow heavily from one option, or you may combine ideas from two or three options. Or you may take a new approach altogether. There are, of course, no perfect solutions. And there is no right or wrong answer. Rather, you should strive to craft an option that is logical and persuasive. Be careful of contradictions. For example, you should not invite Russia's neighbors to join NATO, while leaving Russia out, if you want to promote cooperation between the United States and Russia.

Name:

## Your Option Five

*Instructions:* In this exercise, you will offer your own recommendations for U.S. policy toward Russia. Your responses to "Focusing Your Thoughts" should help you identify the guiding values of your proposal.

1. How are U.S. interests affected by the transition of Russia and its neighbors?

2. What should be the most important goals guiding U.S. policy toward Russia?

3. What policy steps should the United States take to achieve the goals you have identified?

4. What are the two strongest arguments opposing your option?

A.

B.

5. What are the two strongest arguments supporting your option?

A.

B.

## Comparing Your Recommendations

*Below are excerpts from a speech delivered by Anthony Lake, assistant to the president for national security affairs, on April 1, 1996, to the U.S.-Russia Business Council. The speech, entitled "The Challenge of Change in Russia," represents a summary of the Clinton administration's policy toward Russia. Now that you have completed "Your Option Five," compare your own recommendations for U.S. policy toward Russia to the Clinton administration's position. (The Supplementary Documents section of your text contains Lake's speech in its entirety.)*

### U.S. interests in Russia's transition

...Now, as before, our special role in the world is to safeguard and strengthen the community of democracies and of open markets, and nowhere is that mission more vital than in Russia....

Helping Russia succeed in this is deeply, profoundly in our national interest. A stable, democratic-oriented, market-oriented Russia would be far less likely to threaten America's security and far more likely to work with us to solve global problems. It can be an important partner in prosperity, with 150 million new consumers for American products. It can be a strong ally against the forces of destruction, whether they take the form of rogue nations or ethnic hatreds or terrorists trafficking in nuclear materials. And it could be a force for stability on a continent long wracked by [illegible]

The situation in Russia today does pose some very real concerns. Senior officials who stood for reform have been fired. Protectionist pressures have jolted our trade [illegible]

[illegible] Russia over [illegible] for nuclear cooperation with Iran. And just last month, the Communist-dominated Duma voted [illegible] Soviet Union....

### U.S. policy goals

We always expected Russia's journey to reform to be uneven and difficult. We do not know, and indeed, we cannot know, what the outcome of that search will be. That is precisely why our strategy is designed for the long-haul. Only by staying engaged, steadily, patiently, intensively, can we help Russia seize the promise of a democratic future instead of reverting to its past. Only by keeping our eyes on the horizon, steering by the stars of our interests and our ideals, can we move toward the goal that will benefit our people, a stable, democratic, market-oriented Russia, secure within its borders and at peace with itself and with its neighbors....

### U.S. policy steps

For our part, we are working closely with our allies to create an integrated, secure Europe where Russia can play an important role....The process of NATO enlargement is moving forward, and it will happen as new members are ready to add to NATO's strength and as the allies reach consensus. As we have stressed to our Russian colleagues, NATO enlargement is not directed at anyone. And the process will neither determine nor depend on events in Russia....

Nowhere will America's partnership with Russia do more to strengthen our mutual security, and nowhere has it been more effective than in reducing the nuclear threat today. Because of our continuing engagement, Warheads are being targeted by Russian missiles....We want to build on this record of progress by enhancing the security of nuclear materials and by improving our ability to fight nuclear smuggling....

We must continue our support for reform through international financial institutions such as the IMF. The new extended fund facility will help Russia keeps its economy on track....As long as the Russians work constructively with us, we will help them establish a tax code that is fair, a capital market that functions, and a legal framework that business needs to do business.

## Alternative Three-Day Lesson Plan

**Day 1:**_____ See Day Two of the Suggested Five-Day Lesson Plan. (Students should have read Part II of the background reading and completed "Study Guide — Part II" before beginning the unit.)
*Homework:* Students should read Part III of the background reading and complete "Study Guide — Part III."

**Day 2:**_____ Assign each student one of the four options, and allow a few minutes for students to familiarize themselves with the mindsets of the options. Call on students to evaluate the benefits and trade-offs of their assigned options. How do the options differ in their interpretation of history? How do they view the prospects for future relations between the United States and Russia? Ask students to respond to a current issue, such as the expansion of NATO into Central Europe, through the perspective of their assigned options. Moving beyond the options, ask students to imagine they are participating in a meeting of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Which beliefs and values should guide the direction of U.S. policy toward Russia? Which threats associated with the FSU should rank at the top of the U.S. policy agenda?
*Homework:* Students should complete "Focusing Your Thoughts" and "Your Option Five."

**Day 3:**_____ See Day Five of the Suggested Five-Day Lesson Plan.

## Making Choices Work in Your Classroom

Like the art of cooking, cooperative group learning is a skill that is rarely perfected on the first attempt, either by teachers or students. Yet with careful preparation, guidance, and practice significant gains can be made quickly. No single recipe guarantees success with cooperative learning or the Choices approach in every classroom. That would be impossible, since each classroom differs in its organization and size, and its unique collection of personalities and needs. However, this section of the Teacher's Resource Book offers a variety of ingredients for teachers to use as they adapt Choices curricula to their classrooms. The suggested ingredients that follow have been drawn from educational research on student-centered instruction and, more important, from the experiences of teachers who have used Choices curricula successfully in their classrooms over the past six years. Educators who have questions about using Choices curricula in their classrooms are encouraged to contact the Choices Education Project in writing, or by calling (401)863-3155. The Choices staff includes experienced classroom teachers who will be pleased to speak with you.

### *Designing Cooperative Learning Groups*

**Group Size:** The key to successful cooperative group work is having a group assignment that is complex enough to require the participation of all group members. Planning the size and composition of working groups in advance is crucial to the successful use of Choices curricula. Research indicates that the ideal size for a cooperative learning group is four or five students. This is certainly the ideal size for group assignments in Choices units. When using Choices units in larger classes, the size of option groups may be expanded to six or seven students. However, it is important to keep in mind that whenever the number of students in a group is increased, the number of roles and expected outcomes must also be expanded.

**Group Composition:** A strength of cooperative learning is that it creates opportunities for students to work together in new combinations on challenging tasks. Cooperative learning not only requires the academic skills of reading, writing, and critical thinking, but the interpersonal skills of communication, negotiation, and problem-solving. In most cases, the style of instruction and learning is most effective when students are assigned to groups by the teacher rather than being allowed to work with their friends. While random group selection can be effective, in most classes successful group composition requires that the teacher considers the personalities, strengths, and needs of the students. For example, artistic students might be assigned to different groups to share their talents and perspectives, while less verbal students could be placed in groups with more outgoing students to help draw them into the lesson. Whenever possible, teachers should try to prevent one student from dominating a group. Explaining the instructions, roles, and ground rules for cooperative learning (see below) helps prevent this. Teachers may choose to group aggressive students with each other, leaving room in other groups for less assertive students to emerge as leaders. Finally, even though the negotiation of roles among the students in a group can be a valuable part of the cooperative learning experience, teachers might choose to assign certain roles, such as group spokesperson, in order to encourage leadership from more reticent students and to keep more aggressive students from dominating.

Students may initially complain about being assigned to groups that do not include their closest friends. We have found that, at the conclusion of the assignment, they will usually express satisfaction with their assigned partners, recognize that they got more accomplished, and sometimes even acknowledge the start of new friendships. The additional time involved in planning group size and composition will pay off when students are actively engaged, debating, and thinking critically.

## Preparing Students for Cooperative Learning

**Provide Clear Written Instructions:** As with any assignment, students benefit from instructions and guidelines that clearly outline expectations and how they will be accomplished. These should be given to students in writing and reviewed with the class. Afterwards, as questions arise within groups, students should refer to the written instructions and attempt to answer each other's questions before asking for the teacher's assistance.

**Establish Ground Rules:** Especially when cooperative learning is a new experience, students benefit from the establishment of ground rules that are explained before groups are formed. Ground rules must be kept simple, and should be designed to keep students involved and on task. Posting these rules in a prominent place in the classroom can be very effective. An example of simple but effective ground rules for the cooperative group assignments could be:

*Everybody has a role (or a job)*
*Everybody participates*
*Nobody dominates*
*Nobody interrupts*

These rules can be enforced by appointing one student to serve as the group manager. The teacher can make it clear that one of the group manager's responsibilities is to enforce the ground rules as the group explores its assigned option and prepares its presentation. The group manager might also be required to make sure that members of the group stay on task and attempt to solve problems before asking for the teacher's assistance. Ground rules that are clear and used consistently can, over time, become an integral component of the classroom, facilitating learning and keeping students on task.

## Managing the Choices Simulation

**Recognize That Debate Is Difficult**

**Recognize That Debate Is Difficult**

**Highlight the Importance of Values:** During the debate and debriefing, it is important to highlight the role of values in the options. Students should be instructed to identify the core values and priorities underlying the different options.

## Moving Beyond the Options

As a culminating activity of a Choices unit, students are expected to articulate their own views of the issue under consideration. An effective way to move beyond the options debate to creating individual options is to have students consider which values in the options framework they hold most dear. Typically, students will hold several of these values simultaneously and will need to prioritize them to reach a considered judgment about the issue at hand. These values should be reflected in their own options and should shape the goals and policies they advocate.

## Adjusting for Large and Small Classes

Choices units are designed for an average class of twenty-five students. In larger classes, additional roles, such as those of newspaper reporter or member of a special interest group, can be assigned to increase student participation in the simulation. With larger option groups, additional tasks might be to create a poster, political cartoon, or public service announcement that represents the viewpoint of an option. In smaller classes, the teacher can serve as the moderator of the debate, and administrators, parents, or faculty can be invited to play the roles of congressional leaders. Another alternative is to combine two small classes.

## Applying Choices to Ability-Grouped Classes

Choices curricula are developed with the majority of high school students in mind. Choices units are not designed solely for students in honors or advanced placement programs. Nor are they designed specifically for students in remedial classes. However, the units are designed to be flexible enough for high school teachers to adapt for *any* classroom, and they have been used successfully in all kinds of classes. The Choices staff places confidence in the ability of teachers to decide which units are best suited for the courses and students they teach. The following suggestions may assist teachers of higher- and lower-ability classes in adapting Choices curricula to meet the needs of their students.

**Lower-Ability Classes:** It would be a mistake to believe that the Choices approach is too difficult for students in lower-ability classes. Teachers report that, with certain adaptations, Choices units can motivate higher levels of student participation, thinking, and confidence in lower-ability classes. Feedback from classroom teachers indicates that the following strategies lead to success with Choices in these classes:

- Maintain high expectations for student learning and thinking.
- Classes of all abilities do a better job with Choices the second or third time the approach is used. Skills in collaboration, communication, and critical thinking improve with practice.
- Some units are easier than others because the necessary background is particularly accessible. Use one of these first to give the students some experience with the approach.
- To make background readings more manageable, some teachers have students read aloud in class, stopping to discuss or clarify key points. Other teachers substitute shorter readings from the textbook or another source as background reading.
- Key concepts from the background can be explained in a mini-lecture format.
- Students can review and keep track of the important terms in a unit by creating their own glossary for reference throughout the unit.
- An extra day for review of the background, for group preparation, or for the development of individual options can be very worthwhile.

**Higher-Ability Classes:** Choices units have much to offer students in higher-ability and advanced placement classes. Students are challenged to understand the internal logic of different arguments and to extrapolate from these while playing the role of advocate. Two-week Choices units are especially rich in historical background, and they highlight the complex relationships among nations through many eras. Choices units on historical topics typically include a wealth of primary source documents for students to read and analyze. These documents can help to prepare students in advanced placement classes for the "Document Based Questions" included on advanced placement examinations. Extra challenge assignments are included in many lesson plans, and every Choices unit includes suggestions for additional reading and research.

**Grading Group Assignments:** Research suggests that it is counterproductive to give students individual grades on cooperative group assignments. A significant part of the assignment given to the group is to cooperate in achieving a common goal, as opposed to looking out for individual interests. Telling students in advance that the group will receive one grade often motivates group members to hold each other accountable. This can foster group cohesion and lead to better group results. It may be useful to note that in addition to the cooperative group assignments, students complete individual assignments as well in every Choices unit.

**Requiring Self-Evaluation:** Having students complete self-evaluations is an extremely effective way to make them think about their own learning. Self-evaluations can take many forms and are useful in a variety of circumstances. They are particularly helpful in getting students to think constructively about group collaboration. In developing a self-evaluation tool for students, teachers need to pose clear and direct questions to students. A sample Group Project Self-Evaluation is included on the following page. Each student should complete his/her own evaluation as part of the unit. Two key benefits of student self-evaluation are that it involves students in the assessment process, and that it provides teachers with valuable insights into the contributions of individual students and the dynamics of different groups. These insights can help teachers to organize groups for future cooperative assignments.

**Evaluating Student Options:** The most important outcomes of a Choices unit are the original options developed and articulated by each student. These will differ significantly from one another, as students identify different values and priorities that shape their viewpoints. These options cannot be graded as right or wrong, but should be evaluated on clarity of expression, logic, and thoroughness. Did the student provide reasons for his/her viewpoint along with supporting evidence? Were the values clear and consistent throughout the option? Did the student identify the risks involved? Did the student present his/her option in a convincing manner?

**Testing:** In a formal evaluation of the Choices approach, it was demonstrated that students using Choices learned the factual information presented as well as or better than students who were taught in a more traditional lecture-discussion format. However, the larger benefits of the Choices approach were evident when students using Choices demonstrated significantly higher ability to think critically, analyze multiple perspectives, and articulate original viewpoints, compared to students who did not use this approach. Teachers should *hold* students accountable for learning historical information, concepts, and current events presented in Choices units. However, a simple multiple-choice examination will not allow students to demonstrate the critical thinking and communication skills developed through the Choices unit. If teachers choose to test students, they may wish to explore new models of test design that require students to do more than recognize correct answers. Tests should not replace the development of student options.

**For Further Reading:** Cohen, Elizabeth G. *Designing Groupwork: Strategies for the Heterogeneous Classroom* (New York: Teachers College Press, 1986).

Name: _____

## Group Project Self-Evaluation

1. What did you contribute to this project?

2. List the names of your partners and briefly comment on each person's contributions.

3. What things went well within your group?

4. What problems did you encounter? How did you attempt to resolve these problems?

5. If you had this assignment to do over again, with the same partners, what would you do differently?

6. Overall, what grade do you think your group deserves on this assignment? Explain your response.

# Publications List

The Choices for the 21st Century Education Project develops curricula for high schools and colleges on current foreign policy issues and offers workshops, institutes, and in-service programs for high school teachers. Course materials place special emphasis on the importance of educating students in their participatory role as citizens. All units incorporate the work of academics and policymakers from a range of perspectives and are classroom tested prior to publication. A new unit is published every three months during the academic year, and all units are updated regularly. For current information on new titles and revisions, call the Choices Education Project at (401) 863-3155 or visit the project on the World Wide Web at *http://www.brown.edu/Research/Choices/*.

### *Current Choices*

- China on the World Stage: Weighing the U.S. Response (Revised Feb. 1996, 77 pages)
- Keeping the Peace in an Age of Conflict: Debating the U.S. Role (Revised Oct. 1995, 69 pages)
- U.S. Immigration Policy in an Unsettled World (Revised April 1996, 63 pages)
- U.S. Trade Policy: Competing in a Global Economy (Revised March 1996, 56 pages)
- Global Environmental Problems: Implications for U.S. Policy (Revised March 1996, 60 pages)
- Help, Handout, or Hindrance: U.S. Support for the Developing World (June 1995, 66 pages)
- Russia's Uncertain Transition: Challenges for U.S. Policy (Revised August 1996, 70 pages)
- Charting Russia's Future in the Post-Soviet Era (Revised Aug. 1996, 72 pages)
- Caught between Two Worlds: Mexico at the Crossroads (Sept. 1996, 62 pages)
- The Role of the United States in a Changing World (Revised Nov. 1995, 44 pages)

### *Decision Points in History*

- A More Perfect Union: Shaping American Government (August 1996, 138 pages)
- Crisis, Conscience, and Choices: Weimar Germany and the Rise of Hitler (Nov. 1994, 84 pages)
- Ending the War against Japan: Science, Morality, and the Atomic Bomb (July 1995, 102 pages)
- Coming to Terms with Power: U.S. Choices after World War II (Aug. 1994, second edition, 68 pages)
- In the Shadow of the Cold War: The Caribbean and Central America in U.S. Foreign Policy (Revised Sept. 1995, 111 pages)
- The Limits of Power: The United States in Vietnam (Nov. 1994, second edition, 119 pages)

## ORDER FORM

| Please send me the following material: | Price | Quantity | Subtotal |
|---|---|---|---|
| China on the World Stage: Weighing the U.S. Response | $12.00 | | |
| Keeping the Peace in an Age of Conflict: Debating the U.S. Role | $12.00 | | |
| U.S. Immigration Policy in an Unsettled World | $12.00 | | |
| U.S. Trade Policy: Competing in a Global Economy | $12.00 | | |
| Global Environmental Problems: Implications for U.S. Policy | $12.00 | | |
| Help, Handout, or Hindrance: U.S. Support for the Developing World | $12.00 | | |
| Russia's Uncertain Transition: Challenges for U.S. Policy | $12.00 | | |
| Charting Russia's Future in the Post-Soviet Era | $12.00 | | |
| Caught between Two Worlds: Mexico at the Crossroads | $12.00 | | |
| The Role of the United States in a Changing World | $12.00 | | |
| A More Perfect Union: Shaping American Government | $14.00 | | |
| Crisis, Conscience, and Choices: Weimar Germany and the Rise of Hitler | $12.00 | | |
| Ending the War against Japan: Science, Morality, and the Atomic Bomb | $12.00 | | |
| Coming to Terms with Power: U.S. Choices after World War II | $12.00 | | |
| In the Shadow of the Cold War: The Caribbean and Central America in U.S. Foreign Policy | $14.00 | | |
| The Limits of Power: The United States in Vietnam | $14.00 | | |

*A teacher's resource book is included free with each unit ordered at regular price.*
*Classroom sets of student texts (15 or more of the same unit) are available at $5 per copy.*

**Subtotal** _____ _____
*add 7% for shipping and handling* _____

**TOTAL** _____ _____

Make checks payable to: **Brown University**

Return to: Choices Education Project
Watson Institute for International Studies
Brown University, Box 1948
Providence, RI 02912

Name _____
School/Org _____
Street _____
City/State _____ Zip _____